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ABSTRACT




This dissertation concerns tax and environmental policy issues central to recent
policy-making debates. Chapter I is written with Kozo Kiyota and concerns the
design of international tax systems. In 2009, Japan introduced a foreign dividend
exemption that exempts from home taxation dividends remitted by Japanese-owned
foreign affiliates to their parent firms. This paper examines the effect of dividend
exemption on profit repatriations by Japanese multinationals. We find the heteroge-
neous responses of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption. Foreign affiliates
with a large stock of retained earnings increased dividend payments more than other
affiliates with the enactment of dividend exemption in 2009. However, the increase
in dividend payments was not associated with foreign corporate tax rates.
Chapter II is motivated by corporate tax reforms of OECD countries that tend to
include both statutory tax rate reductions and base broadening (tax-cut-cum-base-
broadening reforms). Analyzing an international tax competition model over tax rates
and bases, I show that when the profitability of outward foreign direct investment
increases relative to the domestic rent of a firm in the home country, the country
viii
undertakes a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reform. I also show that if the domestic
rent is large relative to the amount of income shifting by multinational firms at the
symmetric equilibrium, larger countries set higher statutory tax rates and a narrower
tax bases.
Chapter III is written with Stephen Salant. Previous analyses of cap-and-trade
programs regulating carbon emissions assumed that firms must surrender permits as
they pollute. If so, then the price of permits may remain constant over measurable
intervals if the government injects additional permits at a ceiling price or may even
collapse if more permits are injected through an auction. However, no cap-and-
trade program actually requires continual compliance. The three federal bills and
California’s AB-32, for example, instead require that firms surrender permits only
periodically to cover their cumulative emissions since the last compliance period. We
develop a methodology for analyzing the effects of such permit injections and show
that anticipated injections of additional permits during the compliance period should
have different effects than under continual compliance.
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CHAPTER I
The Effect of Moving to a Territorial Tax System
on Profit Repatriations: Evidence from Japan
1.1 Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, the design of international tax policies, re-
garding whether and how to tax corporate incomes earned in foreign countries by
multinational firms, has received a great deal of attention from policymakers and
economists in advanced countries. While taxing foreign source income would raise
revenue, international tax rules significantly influence the business activities of multi-
national corporations, including the location of foreign direct investment, income
reallocation (income shifting) through transfer pricing, and profit repatriation. The
United States taxes foreign income upon repatriation, allowing foreign tax credits for
corporate income taxes and other related taxes paid to foreign governments under the
so-called worldwide income tax system. In contrast to a worldwide income tax system,
a territorial tax system exempts foreign income from home taxation; such systems
are employed by many advanced countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.1 In the United States, policymakers
and economists have long discussed changing the current worldwide tax system to a
1As of 2008, 21 of the 30 OECD countries employed a territorial tax system (METI, 2008).
1
territorial tax system.
Japan, the focus of this study, had a worldwide income tax system until the
end of March 2009. At that time, the Japanese government was concerned that
under the worldwide tax system, Japanese multinational corporations retained abroad
a large portion of foreign profits earned by their affiliates and did not repatriate
them to Japan. Japanese firms arguably had incentive to do so because their foreign
incomes were taxed at high rates (as high as 40 percent) upon such repatriation.2
To stimulate dividend repatriations from Japanese-owned foreign affiliates, Japan
introduced a permanent foreign dividend exemption in April 2009 and exempted
from home taxation dividends remitted by foreign affiliates to their Japanese parent
firms. Thus, with the introduction of the dividend exemption system, the Japanese
corporate tax system moved to a territorial tax system.
This paper examines the effect of dividend exemption on profit repatriations by
Japanese multinationals. Using affiliate-level data, we investigate whether the switch
to the dividend exemption system increased the amount of dividend payments by for-
eign affiliates, as the Japanese government expected, and whether the responsiveness
of dividend remittances to foreign tax rates (corporate income taxes and withholding
income taxes on repatriated dividends) was changed by the adoption of the dividend
exemption system. Few studies have empirically tested the effects of a “permanent”
dividend exemption and examined the actual outcomes of changing the regime from
a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system.3 Egger et al. (2011) study foreign
dividend exemption enacted in the tax reform of the United Kingdom in 2009 and
find that foreign affiliates owned by U.K. multinational firms responded to the tax
reform by increasing dividend payments to their owners. Tajika et al. (2012) inves-
2In 2009, the corporate income tax rate of Japan was the highest among the OECD member
countries (OECD, 2010).
3The previous literature utilizes cross-country differences in international tax systems to examine
the effect of corporate taxes under the two tax regimes on foreign direct investment (Slemrod, 1990;
Hines, 1996; Altshuler and Grubert, 2001). Desai and Hines (2004) estimate a tax burden on foreign
income of $50 billion per year under the U.S. worldwide income tax system.
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tigate the impact of Japan’s dividend exemption on dividends received by Japanese
parent firms from their foreign subsidiaries. They find that more parent firms, espe-
cially those facing greater demand for cash, increased dividends received from their
foreign affiliates in response to the enactment of dividend exemption in 2009.4 Unlike
Tajika et al. (2012), this paper studies the effect of dividend exemption on dividend
payments at the affiliate level and the responsiveness of dividend payments to repatri-
ation tax costs. Each foreign affiliate faced a different tax cost of paying dividends to
its parent firm in Japan under the worldwide tax system, depending on the corporate
tax payments to the host country and the withholding tax payments on dividends.
Thus, the advantage of our study is that we can utilize the variations in the tax costs
of dividend repatriations among affiliates to identify the impact of the tax reform on
dividend repatriations.
We use the micro database of the annual survey conducted by the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI), The Survey of Overseas Business
Activities. The survey provides information on the financial and operating charac-
teristics of Japanese firms operating abroad, including dividends paid to Japanese
investors. We analyze the data from 2007 to 2009 to focus on the first-year response
of Japanese multinationals to the dividend exemption system, noting that the first-
year response is likely to be different from that in subsequent years for two reasons.
First, as we will explain in detail in the next section, most Japanese multinationals
expected the introduction of the dividend exemption system before the end of the
2008 accounting year. Thus, they might have reduced dividend repatriations in 2008
in anticipation of the adoption of the dividend exemption system and increase them
in 2009. Second, some firms may have repatriated as a one-time choice in 2009 large
amounts of foreign income that they had retained and accumulated over a long period
4Some studies have investigated the effects of the one-time dividend deductions permitted by the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 on the profit repatriations, domestic investment and employ-
ment, market values, and income shifting behavior of U.S. multinational corporations (Oler et al.,
2007; Blouin and Krull, 2009; Redmiles, 2009; Bradley, 2011; Dharmapala et al., 2011).
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to avoid taxation in Japan.5
We find that Japanese corporate taxes had a significant negative effect on div-
idend repatriations before 2009 under the worldwide income tax system. Despite
the dividend exemption system substantially eliminating corporate tax liabilities on
repatriated dividends in Japan, our analysis of the survey data provides no evidence
that the dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of the typical
foreign affiliate that had paid no dividends under the worldwide tax system. However,
the response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption was heterogeneous.
Foreign affiliates that had retained and accumulated large profits under the worldwide
tax system increased dividend payments more than other affiliates with the enact-
ment of dividend exemption in 2009. Therefore, dividend exemption fulfilled the main
aim to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates with a large stock of
retained earnings in line with the expectation of the Japanese government.
Surprisingly, we find no evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repatriations
to foreign tax rates changed with the enactment of dividend exemption. More pre-
cisely, the increase in dividend payments was not associated with either the grossed-up
tax rate difference between Japan and foreign countries, or the withholding tax rates
on repatriated dividends. The Japanese government was concerned that adopting
a territorial tax system may facilitate tax avoidance by multinational corporations
shifting foreign income to low tax countries. Though it might take more time for
companies to change their tax strategies in response to the tax reform, our results
suggest that Japanese parent firms did not immediately respond to dividend exemp-
tions by reallocating their foreign profits to their foreign affiliates in low tax countries
and increasing dividend repatriations by those affiliates in 2009.
5In addition, the response specific to the first year of the dividend exemption system, if any,
would be important in the comparison with the American Job Creation Act of 2004 enacted in the
United States, which gave U.S. corporations a one-time deduction of 85 percent of dividends received
from their foreign affiliates under some conditions. As we will discuss in the next section, the laws
enacted in Japan and the United States are quite different in terms of the conditions and procedures
of exempting received dividends.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the background and
the provisions of dividend exemption enacted in Japan. Section 1.3 calculates the
tax costs of remitting profits from foreign subsidiaries to their parent firms in Japan
by dividends, royalties or interest, and shows how Japanese dividend exemption has
changed the tax costs of profit repatriations. Section 1.4 describes the data we use.
Section 1.5 presents empirical results from our preliminary analysis regarding the first-
year response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption. Section 1.6 extends
the empirical model in Section 1.5 to analyze the heterogeneity of the responses
to dividend exemption depending on the size of the stock of retained earnings of
foreign affiliates. Section 1.7 present the results of robustness tests and alternative
specifications. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Dividend Exemption System Enacted in Japan in
2009
In May 2008, a subcommittee on international taxation at METI began to discuss
the introduction of a dividend exemption in the corporate tax reform for 2009; this
was publicly known because newspaper articles reported this development at the
time.6 In August 2008, the subcommittee released an interim report and proposed
introducing a dividend exemption (METI, 2008). In the report, METI estimated
that the stock of retained earnings of Japanese-owned foreign affiliates was 17 trillion
Japanese yen as of 2006.7 Their concern was that an excessive amount of profit
was retained in foreign countries to avoid home-country taxation in Japan, which
distorted the decisions of Japanese corporations on the timing of profit repatriations
and reduced domestic R&D investment that could be financed from foreign-source
6The discussion of Japan’s foreign dividend exemption in this section largely draws on Aoyama
(2009) and Masui (2010).
7Seventeen trillion yen are worth about 15 billion U.S. dollars at the 2006 exchange rate of 1
USD = 116.299 JPY (UNCTAD, 2012).
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income. In November 2008, the Tax Commission also recommended the introduction
of a dividend exemption system. Finally, this regime change was included in the
legislation of the 2009 tax reform. The legislation was passed into law on March 27,
2009 and came into effect on April 1, 2009.8
The dividend exemption system permits Japanese resident corporations to deduct
from taxable income 95 percent of dividends received from foreign affiliates in ac-
counting years commencing on or after April 1, 2009. The rest (five percent) of the
dividends are regarded as expenses incurred by parent firms for earning the dividends
and are added to the calculation of their taxable incomes in Japan.9 In order to qual-
ify for dividend exemption, a parent firm must have held at least 25 percent of the
shares of its affiliate for at least six months as of the dividend declaration date. While
dividend exemption would reduce corporate tax liabilities on repatriated dividends
in Japan, foreign tax credits no longer apply to withholding taxes on repatriated
dividends imposed by host countries.
The new system is still quite distant from pure source-based taxation. As the
term “dividend” exemption suggests, it only exempts foreign income in the form of
paid dividends and does not apply to other types of foreign source income, including
royalties, interest payments, income earned by foreign branches, and capital gains.
Foreign taxes imposed on those income types continue to be creditable under the
direct foreign tax credit system in Japan.
Finally, because this paper focuses on the first-year response to dividend exemp-
tion, the difference between Japan’s foreign dividend exemption enacted under the
8The subcommittee also examined the possibility of introducing a one-time dividend exemption
similar to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, limiting the use of dividends exempted from
home taxation. However, the subcommittee concluded that a one-time dividend exemption would
stimulate dividend repatriations only during the period under the exemption rule and would have
an aftereffect that would counteract the effect of dividend exemption. They were also concerned
that limiting the use of exempted dividends would distort the managerial decisions and undermine
managerial efficiency of Japanese corporations (METI, 2008).
9The expenses corresponding to the five percent of the repatriated dividends are assumed to be
deducted from the taxable incomes of parent firms when they invest in their subsidiaries, and thus,
would not be exempted upon repatriation under the new exemption system.
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2009 tax reform and the dividend tax deduction under the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 (AJCA) is also noteworthy. First, while the AJCA provides U.S. multi-
national corporations with a special one-time deduction of 85 percent of dividends
received from their foreign affiliates, Japan’s dividend exemption is permanent. Sec-
ond, under the AJCA, the 85 percent exemption applies only to “extraordinary divi-
dends,” which are defined as dividend payments exceeding average repatriations over
a five-year period ending before July 1, 2003, excluding the highest and lowest years.10
Therefore, the exemption is limited to a part of dividends paid (extraordinary divi-
dends), and U.S. multinationals could claim the exemption only if they received for-
eign dividends more than the average amount. On the other hand, Japan’s dividend
exemption applies to 95 percent of all dividends as long as the conditions described
above are satisfied.11 Thus, we note that the exemption permitted under the new tax
system in Japan is quite different from and more generous than the exemption under
the AJCA in the United States.
1.3 How Dividend Exemption Affects Profit Repatriations of
Japanese Multinationals
Hartman (1985) demonstrated that under certain conditions, repatriation taxes
do not affect the decisions on marginal investment and dividend payments made by
“mature” subsidiaries that finance their marginal investment out of their own retained
earnings. However, this result depends on the assumption that repatriation tax rates
are constant over time. This assumption could fail to hold because repatriation tax
rates on dividends change depending on the foreign tax credit positions of parent
firms under a worldwide income tax system and the definition of taxable income (tax
10In addition, to be eligible for the dividends-received deduction, dividends must be paid in cash
and invested in approved activities in the United States, although this requirement may not be
binding for U.S. multinationals (Blouin and Krull, 2009; and Dharmapala et al., 2011).
11The Japanese government estimates that given the requirements described above, more than 95
percent of foreign affiliates would be eligible for dividend exemption.
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bases) in host countries.12
In addition to those cases, repatriation tax rates also vary because of changes in
the international tax regime. As we discussed in the previous section, Japanese firms
learned at the latest in May 2008 that the government was discussing the introduction
of a dividend exemption. Thus, they could expect the tax regime change before the
end of the 2008 accounting year, and some firms may have expected it even earlier.
In this situation, as we show in Appendix A, even mature foreign affiliates would
increase dividend payments to their parent firms in response to a decrease in the
repatriation tax rate due to the enactment of dividend exemption.
In what follows, we calculate the tax costs of remitting profits from foreign sub-
sidiaries to their parent firms in Japan by dividends, royalties, or interest, given their
decisions on foreign direct investment and show how Japan’s dividend exemption has
changed the tax costs of profit repatriations. We will then make predictions for our
empirical analysis based on the changes in the repatriation tax costs.
To consider tax liabilities on foreign dividends under Japan’s worldwide tax system
(before April 2009) and the new exemption system (after April 2009), we calculate
the tax costs of remitting an additional dollar of foreign income to Japan by divi-
dends, royalties or interest. Let Yijc denote the pre-tax profit of affiliate i operating
in country c owned by parent j and Tijc the foreign corporate income tax paid by
subsidiary i. We define the average subsidiary tax rate as τijc = Tijc/Yijc. Denote the
statutory corporate tax rate of Japan and country c by τH and τc, respectively. The




Under the worldwide tax system in Japan before April 2009, the tax liability
of parent j to receive one dollar of dividends from its own affiliate i in country c
12There is evidence that repatriation taxes discourage dividend payouts of U.S. corporations (Hines
and Hubbard, 1990; Grubert, 1998; Desai et al., 2001). In contrast, using Japanese affiliate-level
data, Tajika and Nakamura (2008) find no evidence of a significant effect of corporate taxes on
dividend repatriation by Japanese multinationals.
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depends on the excess foreign tax credit position of parent j: whether the parent
is in a situation of excess limit or excess credit. A parent firm whose foreign tax
payments are less than the foreign tax credit limit, where the foreign tax credit limit
is calculated as the total foreign taxable income times the Japanese corporate tax
rate, is referred to as being in excess limit. In contrast, if the foreign tax payments
are greater than the foreign tax credit limit, the parent is referred to as being in excess
credit and can use excess foreign tax credits — the difference between the foreign tax
payments and the foreign tax credit limit — to reduce the Japanese tax obligations
on foreign source income in the next three years.
Suppose parent firm j is in excess limit. Then it could claim foreign tax credits
for the taxes paid to host country c when affiliate i remits one dollar of dividends.
The dollar of dividends would be deemed as 1/(1 − τijc) dollars of taxable income
in Japan (gross-up formula), which yields the corporate tax liability of τH/(1− τijc).
Parent i also has to pay withholding taxes on the dividend wDc to country i. Thus, the
total tax payment to receive one dollar of dividends is
[
τH/(1− τijc) + wDc
]
. Parent
i can also claim foreign tax credits for the taxes paid to country c: the corporate tax
payment τijc/(1− τijc) and the withholding tax on the dollar of dividends wDc . Thus,
the net tax payment of parent j to receive one dollar of dividends from its affiliate i

















which is the difference between the Japanese statutory tax rate and the subsidiary
average tax rate grossed up by the subsidiary average tax rate.
If parent j is in an excess credit position, the parent can use excess foreign tax
credits to wipe out the Japanese corporate tax liability.13 Then the net tax payment
13Even when parent j is in an excess credit position, the foreign tax credit that parent j can claim
is limited up to the Japanese tax liability on the dollar of dividends (τH/(1− τijc)).
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is wDc . In sum, the tax costs of remitting one dollar of dividends can be written as Pijc = (τH − τijc)/(1− τijc) if parent j is in excess limit;wDc if parent j is in excess credit. (1.1)
After the introduction of the dividend exemption system (after April 2009), parent
j can exclude 95 percent of dividends from its taxable income and has to include only
five percent of the dividends in taxable income. Thus, the net tax payment to receive





Therefore, if parent j is in an excess limit position, the dividend exemption system
eliminates almost the entire corporate tax liability in Japan.14 The repatriation tax
cost of repatriating dividends decreases from (τH − τijc)/(1 − τijc) to 0.05τH when
controlling for the withholding tax rate on dividends wDc .
15 On the other hand, be-
cause the withholding taxes on dividends are no longer creditable under the dividend
exemption system, parent i has to pay wDc , which would have been creditable under
the worldwide tax system before 2009.
When the repatriation tax costs decrease to 0.05τH (controlling for w
D
c ), which
is the same for all firms, foreign affiliates will increase dividend payments under the
new exemption system as long as repatriation taxes are a binding constraint on their
dividend payout decisions. In addition, Japanese multinationals face different repa-
triation tax costs depending on their foreign tax credit positions and the corporate
14We note that most Japanese corporations are expected to be in excess limit positions because
of the relatively high corporate tax rate of Japan. In the data from 2007 to 2009, only 6.9 percent
of foreign affiliates faced average tax rates higher than the Japanese corporate tax rate. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that most parent firms are in excess limit situations or that even if they are
in excess credit, they do not have ssubstatial excess foreign tax credits.
15In this section, we assume Pijc = (τH−τijc)/(1−τijc) > 0.05τH . In the data from 2007 to 2009,
91.8 percent of foreign affiliates satisfy this condition.
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tax policies of the host countries. Because dividend exemption eliminates Japanese
corporate tax liability on repatriated dividends (Pijc), dividend payments should be-
come less sensitive to the difference between the Japanese statutory tax rate and the
subsidiary average tax rate grossed up by the subsidiary average tax rate (Pijc) after
2009. In other words, when we measure dividend payments as a fraction of affiliate
sales to control for the firm size, foreign affiliates in lower-tax countries (higher Pijc)
should pay more dividends scaled by sales than other affiliates under the exemption
system. Therefore, we expect the following effects of dividend exemption on profit
repatriations by Japanese multinationals:
H1: Dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates increase when controlling for the
withholding tax rate on dividends.
H2: Foreign affiliates in lower-tax countries (higher Pijc) should pay more dividends
scaled by sales than other affiliates.16
H3: Dividend payments become more sensitive to the withholding tax rates on div-
idends.
While the dividend exemption system substantially changes the tax costs of repa-
triating foreign dividends, it does not change the tax treatments of repatriated roy-
alties and interest payments at all. Consider the tax costs of remitting one dollar
of a royalty or interest from affiliate i to its parent j. Because they are deductible
payments, remitting an additional dollar as a royalty or interest will reduce the cor-
porate tax payment in country c by τc. The corporate tax liability on the dollar of
16Under the Japanese worldwide tax system, foreign tax credits apply to dividends paid by for-
eign subsidiaries directly owned by Japanese parent firms and their second-tier subsidiaries (sub-
subsidiaries). Our data has information on dividend paid by foreign subsidiaries owned by Japanese
parents but does not have information on dividend indirectly paid by the second-tier subsidiaries
through the first-tier subsidiaries. Therefore, the tax differential Pijct could misrepresent the tax
costs for dividends paid by first-tier foreign subsidiaries if a large portion of those dividends origi-
nally come from second-tier subsidiaries and if the second tier-subsidiaries face substantially different
corporate tax rates in their host countries from those faced by the first-tier subsidiaries.
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deductible payments is τH . Parent j also has to remit to the government of country
c the withholding tax on one dollar of a royalty wRc or on the dollar of interest w
I
c .
Then, if parent j is in excess limit, it would claim a foreign tax credit for the
withholding tax on the dollar of royalty or interest (wRc or w
I
c ). The net tax payment
of remitting one dollar of deductible payments is (τH − τc). If parent j is in an excess
credit position, excess foreign tax credits would reduce the tax liability in Japan by




for the royalty payment and(
wIc − τc
)
for the interest payment.
In summary, regardless of the introduction of the dividend exemption system, the
net tax costs of remitting one dollar of a royalty can be written as
 τH − τc if parent j is in excess limit;wRc − τc if parent j is in excess credit. (1.3)
The net tax costs of remitting one dollar of interest payments can be written as
 τH − τc if parent j is in excess limit;wIc − τc if parent j is in excess credit. (1.4)
As Grubert (1998) shows, those tax costs could affect dividend repatriations to
the extent that royalties and interest payments substitute or complement dividends
as an alternative means of profit repatriations. In the following sections, we empir-
ically examine how the response of dividend payments by Japanese-owned foreign
affiliates to the repatriation tax costs changed due to the introduction of the dividend
exemption regime and test hypotheses H1-H3.
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1.4 Data
We use the micro database of the annual survey conducted by METI, The Survey
of Overseas Business Activities. The main purpose of this survey is to obtain basic
information on the business activities of foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms. The
survey covers all Japanese firms that owned affiliates abroad as of the end of the
fiscal year (March 31). A foreign affiliate of a Japanese firm is defined as a firm that
is located in a foreign country in which the Japanese firm had at least a 10 percent
equity share. The survey provides data on the financial and operating characteristics
of Japanese firms operating abroad, including dividends and royalties paid to Japanese
investors. Industrial classification is available at the two-digit level.
To control for parent-firm characteristics, we use another METI survey, The Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. This survey covers all firms
with 50 or more employees and capital or an investment fund of at least 30 million
yen, for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. The survey provides
data on the financial and operating characteristics of Japanese parent firms.
We merge these two annual cross-section surveys to develop a longitudinal (panel)
data set of foreign subsidiaries from 2007 to 2009. Each subsidiary is traced through-
out the period using information such as parent and affiliate IDs as a key.17 After
dropping observations with missing dividend values, our panel from the METI surveys
contains 27,713 observations of foreign affiliates from 2007 to 2009 with information
on dividend payments available.18
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics of dividend payments by foreign affiliates for
each year from 2007 to 2009. Notably, both the sum and mean of dividend payments in
2009 are larger than those in 2007 and 2008. The total amount of dividend payments
17The parent ID is obtained from The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities.
We also used the information on location and establishment year to trace each subsidiary.
18Before 2007, the first METI survey collected dividend payments to Japanese investors every four
years.
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decreased from 2007 to 2008 by 22.5 percent and increased from 2008 to 2009 by 70
percent. There is a similar trend in the mean of dividend payments. However, it is
worth noting that those changes are caused by a small number of foreign affiliates.
Although the sum and means of dividends are larger in 2009 than in 2007 and 2008,
dividend payments in the seventy-fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles in 2009 are smaller
than in 2007 and 2008. This implies that dividend payments above the ninety-ninth
percentile in 2009 were larger by far than those in 2007 and 2008.19 We also note
that the distribution of dividend payments is heavily skewed to the left. Most foreign
affiliates paid no dividends (as detailed in Table 1.3).
=== Table 1.1 ===
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of dividend payments by foreign affiliates
scaled by their sales to control for the size of the affiliates and changes in foreign
exchange rates.20 While the mean in 2009 is lower that in 2007, the dividend payments
as a fraction of sales are larger in 2009 than those in 2007 and 2008 in the ninety-fifth
percentile and above. Table 1.3 shows the numbers of foreign affiliates that paid no
dividends and that paid dividends to Japanese investors in each year from 2007 to
2009. Strikingly, the proportion of foreign affiliates paying dividends is lowest in 2009
(25.8 percent) among the three years.
=== Tables 1.2 and 1.3 ===
In summary, while dividend payments at higher percentiles increased, the propor-
tion of foreign affiliates paying dividends did not increase in 2009. This is suggestive
of the heterogeneous response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption. Al-
though the dividend exemption system may not stimulate profit repatriations from
19We cannot indicate the maximum and minimum values for the sake of maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the data.
20The Japanese yen consistently appreciated over the period as follows: 1 USD = 118 JPY in
2007, 103 JPY in 2008, and 94 JPY in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2012). Thus, the increase in dividend
repatriations could be undervalued as measured by Japanese yen without scaling.
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most foreign affiliates that had not paid dividends under the worldwide tax system, a
small portion of firms that had paid large amounts of dividends under the worldwide
tax system may increase dividends paid further as a result of dividend exemption.
Those observations motivate our regression analysis in the following sections by tak-
ing into account the possibility that the response of foreign affiliates to dividend
exemption varies depending on the stock of retained earnings right before 2009.
1.5 Preliminary Analysis
To test our hypotheses H1-H3, we examine how the dividend exemption system
affected the repatriation behavior of Japanese multinational corporations and changed
the responsiveness of repatriated dividends to repatriation taxes (corporate taxes
and withholding taxes) in 2009. One limitation in our data set is that it does not
include information on the foreign tax credit positions of parent firms (excess limit or
excess credit). Thus, we cannot identify the tax costs of remitting dividends for each
affiliate based on its parent’s credit position. However, as Grubert (1998) and Desai
et al. (2001) point out, because companies are uncertain about their long-run credit
positions and foreign tax credit positions are endogenous to repatriation behavior,
adjusting the repatriation tax costs depending on parent foreign tax credit positions
would also be problematic.
As a preliminary analysis of dividend repatriation patterns before and after the
tax reform, our identification strategy in this section employs a before-and-after com-
parison using a post-reform dummy variable.21 We attempt to control for confounding
factors that potentially affect dividend payments (measured in Japanese yen), such
as macroeconomic conditions, foreign exchange rates, tax policies of host countries,
and parent firm characteristics, as follows. First, we scale dividend payments by affil-
21Several studies have employed a before-and-after comparison approach to examine policy effects.
See, for example, Kim and Kross (1998), Blouin et al. (2004), Chetty and Saez (2005), and Kiyota
and Okazaki (2005).
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iate sales. Second, in our regression analysis described below, country-industry fixed
effects are included to control for systematic differences in dividend payments across
different industries and countries, which are possibly due to country-specific macroe-
conomic conditions over the entire data period. We also control for foreign exchange
rates between Japanese yen and local currencies. To take into account demand for
internal cash by parent firms, we will control for the profitability and the total debt
of parent firms.22
We estimate the following equation in the spirit of Grubert (1998):



















+ β5 (DEt ∗ τct) + γXijct + uijct, (1.5)
where Dividendijct is the dividend payments of affiliate i located in country c to its
Japanese parent j divided by affiliate sales, in year t. The dummy variable DEt is
equal to one if t = 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. This dummy variable and
its interaction terms with the tax variables are intended to capture the changes in
dividends paid and responsiveness of dividends to the tax variables. As defined in
the previous section, Pijct is the grossed-up tax rate differential between Japan and
foreign country c.23 The withholding tax rates of country c in year t on dividends,
22One may argue that we can create control and treatment groups using the information on
fiscal year end months of parent companies and employ a difference-in-differences estimation, noting
that dividend exemption applies to dividends received by parent companies in the accounting years
starting on or after April 1, 2009. This requirement implies that parent firms whose accounting
years end in March can apply for dividend exemption in the accounting years from 2009, while other
firms can do so in the accounting years from 2010. However, we cannot tell from the data exactly
when foreign subsidiaries pay dividends to their parents in a year. In addition, if fiscal year end
months of parent companies are not March, their foreign subsidiaries should have an incentive to
delay dividend payments so that the parents receive them in the accounting year of 2010 (but in
the data period for 2009) and can claim exemption for those dividends. Therefore, it is difficult to
identify dividends that did not qualify for dividend exemption in the data for 2009.
23To apply the gross-up calculation to Pijc = (τH − τijc)/(1 − τijc) appropriately, we dropped
observations with negative corporate tax payments (Tijct < 0). The average subsidiary tax rate
(τijc = Tijct/Yijct) is set to 0 if Tijct = 0 and Yijct = 0, where Yijct is the pre-tax profit of affiliate j,
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tax rate of country c in year t is τct.
25 The vector of other control variables are denoted
as Xijct, including the exchange rate between Japanese yen and the local currency in
country c normalized to one at the level in 2005, lagged parent net profit scaled by
total assets, lagged parent total debt scaled by total assets, country dummies, and
industry dummies. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all the scaled
variables used in the analysis at the top and bottom one percent. The definitions of
the variables are summarized in Table 1.4. Table 1.5 provides summary statistics for
all of these variables before the winsorization.
=== Tables 1.4 and 1.5 ===
From the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, we expect the signs of
the key parameters to be as follows. If the dividend exemption system uniformly
stimulated dividend repatriations by foreign affiliates of Japanese multinational firms,
the coefficient on DEt would be estimated to be positive, as hypothesized in H1
(β0 > 0). The coefficient on Pijct is expected to be negative (α1 < 0) because higher
repatriation tax costs would discourage dividend payments under the worldwide tax
system. If dividend payments became less sensitive to the tax rate differential between
Japan and foreign countries under the new exemption system as hypothesized in H2,
and is also set to 0.5 because foreign tax credits would apply up to 50% of foreign taxable income.
24We collect information on withholding tax rates on dividends, royalties, and in-
terest from the database of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), J-FILE
(http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/search/cost/). These data provide up-to-date information on the
withholding tax rates of 75 countries for 2011. We also collect information on the with-
holding tax rates of 46-51 countries for 2007-2010 from the reports published by JETRO
(http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/reports/). To supplement the information on the withholding tax
rates for the countries that JETRO’s data do not cover, in cases where Japan has tax treaties with
these countries, we use the withholding tax rates determined in the tax treaties. We also obtain
the information on the withholding tax rates from the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, which is
published by Ernst & Young, and the Worldwide Tax Summaries, which is published by Pricewater-
houseCoopers. Finally, our data contains information on the withholding tax rates of 96 countries
from 2007 to 2009, which is used in our current analysis.
25Data on statutory corporate income tax rates are obtained from the KPMG Corporate and
Indirect Tax Survey 2011. The statutory tax rates include sub-central (statutory) corporate income
tax rates.
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the coefficient on (DEt ∗ Pijct) would be estimated to be positive (β1 > 0). Another
interpretation of H2 is that if dividend repatriations from lower-tax countries (high
Pijct) were discouraged under the worldwide tax system, foreign affiliates in these
countries should pay more dividends scaled by sales than other affiliates when dividend
exemption substantially eliminates the repatriation tax burden.
The coefficient on wDct is expected to be negative (α2 < 0) because the tax price
of dividends equals the withholding tax rate on dividends (wDct) if a parent firm is
in excess credit. If dividend repatriation becomes more sensitive to the withholding
tax rates on dividends under the new exemption system, as hypothesized in H3, the
coefficient on (DEt ∗ wDct) would be estimated to be negative (β2 < 0). The signs of
the coefficients on the withholding tax rates and the statutory tax rates would depend
on how strongly dividends substitute for royalties or interest as an alternative means
of profit repatriations.
We employ a Tobit procedure because most affiliates (72 percent of all affiliates
in the sample) pay zero dividends, and thus, the dependent variable in equation
(1.5) could be considered as a right-censored variable. We estimate the equation
including country and industry fixed effects to control for systematic difference in
dividend payments across different industries and countries, and thus use across-
affiliate variations to identify the parameters.26.
Table 1.6 presents the estimation results. The point estimates are marginal effects
on the latent dependent variable, which can be interpreted as a “desired” amount of
dividend payments.27 Notably, the estimated coefficient on DEt is not positive and
26We do not include affiliate fixed effects in the Tobit models because of the incidental parameters
problem, which renders estimators in non-linear panel data models with fixed effects inconsistent
and biased and would be especially serious in a short panel like ours (Greene, 2007).
27In our analysis, the key parameters of interest are the interaction terms of DEt and other tax
variables. As Ai and Norton (2003) shows, the interaction effect in nonlinear models is different from
the marginal effect of the interaction term. Therefore, in the estimation of our empirical models using
a Tobit procedure, the marginal effect of the interaction terms on the observed dividend payments
(conditional on positive dividend payments) cannot be calculated in a normal manner. Thus, we
focus on the marginal effects on the latent variable for dividend payments, which is a linear function
of independent variables.
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significantly different from zero in any specifications. This suggests that the dividend
exemption system did not increase dividend payments of the “typical” (or median)
affiliate that did not pay dividends under the worldwide tax system. This result is
inconsistent with hypothesis H1. The coefficient on DEt, of course, could falsely at-
tribute the change in dividend payments in 2009 due to unobserved macroeconomic
factors or the relevant structural shift in the Japanese economy during the data
period.28 However, this result is still surprising because we had expected that multi-
national firms demonstrate the largest response in the first year of the new exemption
system by repatriating accumulated profits in foreign countries.
=== Table 1.6 ===
The estimated coefficient on the tax price of dividends (Pijct) is negative and
statistically different from zero at the one-percent level in all specifications. This
suggests that the Japanese worldwide tax system significantly discouraged dividend
repatriations from foreign affiliates in low tax countries because dividend repatriations
triggered an additional tax liability proportional to the difference between Japanese
and foreign tax rates under the worldwide tax system. However, the estimated coef-
ficient on (DEt ∗Pijct) is also negative in all specifications, which is inconsistent with
hypothesis H2. This suggests that dividend payments did not become less sensitive
to the tax rate differential between Japan and foreign countries in the first year of the
dividend exemption system. In other words, foreign affiliates in lower tax countries
did not significantly increase dividend payments to their parents more than other af-
filiates. The coefficient on (DEt ∗wDct) is estimated to be negative, which is consistent
with hypothesis H3 but not significant in either of specifications (3) and (4).
In summary, we find no evidence that the dividend exemption system stimulated
dividend repatriations of “typical” foreign affiliates as hypothesized in H1 and H2.
28Most notably, the financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers severely hit
the Japanese economy in 2008.
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There are caveats for interpreting the estimation results. First, one limitation of
relying on the DEt dummy variable to measure the average change in the level of
dividend payments of foreign affiliates is that the estimated coefficient on DEt might
falsely capture possible effects of cyclical and secular macroeconomic trends on profit
repatriations in spite of our attempt to control for those confounding factors by the
various control variables described above. Second, as Tables 1.1 and 1.2 may imply,
the response of foreign affiliates to dividend exemption is heterogeneous. Foreign af-
filiates that have larger payout capacity of dividends than other affiliates, for example
those with a large stock of retained earnings, may have responded more flexibly to
dividend exemption by increasing dividend payments to their parent firms.
1.6 Heterogeneous Response to Dividend Exemption: By
Stock of Retained Earnings
As we described in Section 1.2, one of the main goals of dividend exemption is
to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign affiliates that had retained and ac-
cumulated large amounts of foreign profit to avoid home taxation in Japan. Foreign
affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings are also expected to show a stronger re-
sponse to dividend exemption because dividends are distributed from after-tax profits
and the stock of retained earnings. In this section, we study a heterogeneous response
to dividend exemption depending on the size of retained earnings of foreign affiliates
and examine whether foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings in 2008
increased dividend payments in a manner consistent with our hypotheses H1 and H2.
We use information on the stock of retained earnings at the end of years 2007 and
2008 and construct a dummy variable equal to one if the stock of retained earnings
scaled by sales is greater than the median value in the sample in the previous year,
which is denoted as Rijct, where i is the index for the affiliate owned by parent firm
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j. Table 1.7 summarizes dividend payments by foreign affiliates with the stock of
retained earnings is larger than the median value in 2008 (Rijc2009 = 1) and dividend
payments by foreign affiliates with Rijc2009 = 0. While the mean of dividend payments
increased by 28.4 percent from 34 million yen in 2008 to 43 million yen in 2009 for
foreign affiliates with Rijc2009 = 0, the mean of dividend payments by those with
Rijc2009 = 1 increased much more sharply by 76.9 percent from 180 million yen in
2008 to 319 million yen in 2009. The mean of dividend payments as a fraction of
affiliate sales for affiliates with Rijc2009 = 1 increased from 4.7 percent in 2008 to 5.5
percent in 2009 while the mean for affiliates with Rijc2009 = 0 remained almost at the
same level between the two years (0.4 percent of affiliate sales). This suggests that
foreign affiliates that retained large amounts of foreign profits at the end of 2008 paid
larger amount of dividends in 2008 than other affiliates and, in addition, increased
sharply dividend payments more sharply in 2009 than other affiliates.
=== Table 1.7 ===
To take into account the heterogeneity of the response to dividend exemption in
the regression equation, we estimate equation (1.5) including the dummy variable Rijct
and the interaction terms of the dummy variable with each of DEt, Pijct, w
D
ct , (DEt ∗
Pijct), and (DEt ∗ wDct) as independent variables. Table 1.8 presents the estimation
results. The coefficient on DEt is still estimated to be negative as in Table 1.6. The
coefficient on Rijct is significantly positive, implying that foreign affiliates that had a
large stock of retained earnings in the previous year paid more dividends in the next
year. In addition, the coefficient on (Rijct ∗ DEt) is also significantly positive. This
suggests that a foreign affiliate with a larger stock of retained earnings in 2008 paid
more dividends than other affiliates in 2009, which is consistent with hypothesis H1.29
29To investigate whether foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings increased desired
dividend payments, we also tested whether the sum of the coefficients on DEt and (Rijct ∗DEt) is
positive and statistically different from zero. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
sum of these coefficient is less than or equal to zero, possibly because the coefficient on DEt is not
precisely estimated.
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The estimated coefficient on (Tij ∗DEt) in column (4) implies that foreign affiliates
with a large stock of retained earnings desired more dividend payments than other
affiliates by 1.8 percent of affiliate sales in 2009.30
=== Table 1.8 ===
The coefficients on (DEt ∗ Pijct) and (Rijct ∗ DEt ∗ Pijct) are not precisely esti-
mated in specifications (3) and (4), although we expected that foreign affiliates with
a large stock of retained earnings should pay more dividends than other affiliates in
2009 as the grossed-up tax differential between Japan and the host country becomes
larger. The coefficient on (Rijct ∗DEt ∗wDct) is negative, which is consistent with our
hypothesis H3, but is not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that
the changes in dividend payments in 2009 were not associated with foreign tax rates
(corporate income tax rates and withholding tax rates on dividends), while the nega-
tive and significant coefficients on Pijct and w
D
ct imply that the tax costs on dividends
discouraged dividend payments under the worldwide tax system. This may suggest
that Japanese multinationals did not aggressively pursue the opportunity to reduce
the repatriation tax cost by repatriating more incomes through foreign affiliates in
low tax countries in 2009, or that they just did not enough time to change their tax
strategies in the first year after the tax regime change.31
In summary, the response of Japanese-owned affiliates to dividend exemption is
heterogeneous depending on the size of the stock of retained earnings. Even though
we could not find an significant effect of dividend exemption on the typical affiliates,
foreign affiliates that had retained large amounts of foreign profits increased dividend
payments more than other affiliates with the enactment of dividend exemption. In
30For the reason described in footnote 27, we focus on the marginal effect on the latent dependent
variable (desired amount of dividend payments).
31Similar results are obtained when we define the dummy variable Rijct equal to one if the stock of
retained earnings scaled by sale is greater than the 75 percentile value in the previous year’s sample,
and when we define Rijct as a continuous variable equal to the stock of retained earnings scaled by
affiliate sales in the previous year.
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this sense, dividend exemption helped to fulfill the main aim to stimulate dividend
repatriations from foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings in line with
the expectation of the Japanese government.
On the other hand, we find no evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repa-
triations to foreign tax rates significantly changed with the enactment of dividend
exemption. The change in dividend payments was not associated with either the
grossed-up tax rate difference between Japan and foreign countries, or the withhold-
ing tax rates on dividends, which is inconsistent with our hypotheses H2 and H3.
The Japanese government was concerned that adopting a territorial tax system may
facilitate tax avoidance by multinational corporations shifting foreign income to low
tax countries. Though it might take more time for companies to change their tax
strategies in response to the tax reform, our results suggest that Japanese parent
firms did not immediately respond to dividend exemption by reallocating their for-
eign profits to their foreign affiliates in low tax countries and increasing dividend
repatriations by those affiliates in 2009, and thus may alleviate the concern of the
Japanese government.
1.7 Robustness Tests and Alternative Specifications
1.7.1 Robustness Tests
In this section, we describe the results from various robustness tests to see how
sensitive the above results are to different specifications. First, one possible concern
about the results obtained in the previous sections is that, because the dividend
payout capacity increases as the profits of foreign subsidiaries increase, the significant
positive coefficient on (Rijct ∗DEt) may be caused by an increase in the profitability
of foreign subsidiaries with a large stock of retained earnings in 2009 and may not be
due to the enactment of dividend exemption. To investigate this issue, we estimate
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the same regression equations as those in Tables 1.6 and 1.8 replacing the dependent
variable by pre-tax profit scaled by affiliate sales.32 While the coefficient on DEt is
not significant and the coefficient on Rijct is significantly positive, the coefficient on
(Rijct∗DEt) is then estimated to be no longer significantly positive. This implies that
the positive effect of dividend exemption on dividend payments by foreign affiliates
with a large stock of retained earnings is not passed through the improvement of the
profitability of foreign subsidiaries with large retained earnings. We also estimate the
regression equations using dividend payments scaled by pre-tax profit as a dependent
variable and then find similar results to those in Tables 1.6 and 1.8. This implies
that foreign affiliates that had accumulated large foreign profits increased dividend
payments relative to its pre-tax profit in 2009 than other affiliates.
Second, there may be a concern about division bias when we used dividend pay-
ments scaled by affiliate sales. Though the scaling variable is used to control for the
subsidiary size, the dependent variable could be overly affected by the year-to-year
fluctuation of subsidiary sales, which may bias the estimated coefficients. To explore
this issue, we try scaling dividend payments by affiliate capital and estimating the
same regression equations in Tables 1.6 and 1.8 by replacing the dependent variable
by dividend payments scaled by capital. We then obtain similar results to those in
Tables 1.6 and 1.8. Therefore, noting that we also obtained the similar results when
scaling dividends by pre-tax profit, we conclude that our results do not depend on
whether to scale dividend payments by affiliate sales, pre-tax profit, or capital, which
alleviates the concern about division bias.
32Unlike the estimation equation for dividend payments, there is no issue on the right-censoring
for the pre-tax profits of foreign subsidiaries. Thus, we employ ordinary least squares to estimate
the pre-tax profit equation.
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1.7.2 Alternative Specifications with One Summary Tax Price
The estimation equations in Section 1.5 and 1.6 focus on capturing the change
in the dividend repatriation behavior of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries by the
dummy variable DEt and its interaction terms with foreign tax rates including the tax
rate differential between Japan and foreign countries (Pijct), the withholding tax rates,
and the statutory tax rates of host countries. We employed that specification because
our three hypotheses feature the changes in the sensitiveness of dividend repatriations
to each of those foreign tax rates separately. However, as an alternative specification,
we could use one tax price summarizing the tax costs of dividend repatriations over
2007-2009 and see the responsiveness of dividend payments by foreign affiliates to the
summary tax variable.
Assuming parent firm j is in excess limit position, dividend exemption changed
the tax cost of paying a dollar of dividends by foreign affiliate i in country c in 2009
from Pijc to (0.05τH + w
D
c ), where Pijc is the grossed-up difference between Japan’s
statutory tax rate and the average subsidiary tax rate, τH is the Japanese statutory
corporate tax rate, and wDc is the withholding tax rate on dividends in country c.
Thus the tax price on dividends over the data period can be summarized by
Tax Priceijct
 Pijc = (τH − τijc)/(1− τijc) if t = 2007, 20080.05τH + wDc . if t = 2009.
We estimate a version of the regression equations in Tables 1.6 and 1.8 including
Tax Priceijct as an independent variables instead of using Pijct , w
D
c , and the inter-
action terms of DEt with other tax variables as independent variables. Tables 1.9
and 1.10 present the estimation results. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 1.9 and
specification (1) in Table 1.10 do not include DEt or its interaction terms with Tax
Priceijct and Rijct. In these specification, the significantly negative coefficient on Tax
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Priceijct suggests that the tax price on dividends discouraged dividend payments by
Japanese multinationals over the entire data period.
=== Tables 1.9 and 1.10 ===
Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 1.9 and specifications (2)-(4) in Table 1.10
include DEt or its interaction terms with Tax Priceijct and Rijct as independent
variables. The coefficients on (DEt∗Tax Priceijct) and (Rijct ∗DEt∗Tax Priceijct) are
intended to capture the possible change in the responsiveness of dividend payments
to the tax price in 2009. The coefficients on DEt and (Rijct ∗ DEt) are intended to
capture the change in the level of dividend payments that is not related to the tax
price in 2009. In specification (4) in Table 1.9 and specifications (3) and (4) in Table
1.10, the estimated coefficient on DEt is negative. The coefficient on (Rijct ∗ DEt)
is estimated to be significantly positive in both specifications (3) and (4) in Table
1.10. This suggests that while the typical affiliate decreased dividend payments in
2009, foreign affiliates that had a large retained earnings in 2008 increased dividend
payments more than other affiliates with the enactment of dividend exemption and
supports the robustness of the result in the previous section.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on (DEt∗Tax Priceijct) and (Rijct ∗
DEt∗Tax Priceijct) is more difficult to interpret because as the signs of these coeffi-
cients change depending on whether to include DEt and (Rijct ∗DEt) as in specifica-
tion (4) in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. While the coefficient on Tax Priceijct is significantly
negative in all specifications, the sum of the coefficient on Tax Priceijct and that on
(DEt∗Tax Priceijct) is 0.002 in specification (4) in Table 1.9 and the sum of the co-
efficients on Tax Priceijct and its interaction terms with DEt and Rijct is also close
to zero in specifications (2) and (4) in Table 1.10. This may suggest that dividend
payments became less sensitive to the tax price on dividends in 2009.
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1.8 Conclusion
Japan introduced a permanent dividend exemption and moved to a territorial tax
system in April 2009. We provide the first evidence about the behavioral response of
foreign affiliates to the transition from a worldwide income tax system to a territorial
tax system by studying Japan’s dividend exemption. We find no evidence that the
dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of the typical foreign
affiliate that had paid no dividends under the worldwide tax system. However, the
response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption was heterogeneous. For-
eign affiliates that had retained large amounts of profits were more responsive to the
tax system change and started to pay more dividends than other affiliates in 2009.
Therefore, dividend exemption helped to fulfill the main aim to stimulate dividend
repatriations from foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings in line
with the expectation of the Japanese government. On the other hand, we find no
evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repatriations to foreign tax rates signif-
icantly changed with the enactment of dividend exemption. The change in dividend
payments was not associated with either the grossed-up tax rate difference between
Japan and foreign countries, or the withholding tax rates on dividends in 2009.
Our results may be informative for international corporate tax policy design in the
United States. The Japanese worldwide tax system was similar to that of the United
States, and the two countries have the highest corporate tax rates among OECD
countries. However, the response of U.S. multinationals to dividend exemption could
be somewhat different than that of Japanese multinationals for two reasons.
First, the impact of a dividend exemption on profit repatriations should crucially
depend on the proportion of parent firms in excess credit positions. Because foreign
affiliates owned by parent firms in excess credit would not face repatriation taxes
(Pijct) in home countries under the worldwide tax system, their repatriation behavior
would not change substantially with the introduction of dividend exemption. Thus, if
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the proportion of Japanese multinationals in excess credit positions under the world-
wide tax system was larger than that of U.S.-owned affiliates, the impact of dividend
exemption in Japan would be smaller than in the United States. In addition, unlike
that of the United States, the Japanese worldwide tax system did not require multi-
national firms to calculate their foreign tax credits for foreign taxes on passive and
active incomes separately. Thus, it might have been easier for Japanese multination-
als to avoid the repatriation taxes by using excess foreign tax credits (cross-crediting)
under the worldwide tax system than for U.S. multinationals.
Second, unlike the United States, Japan has tax-sparing agreements with several
countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zambia
as of June 2012) in its tax treaties. Foreign affiliates in those countries may be less
responsive to dividend exemption because the tax sparing provisions could substan-
tially decrease their repatriation tax costs under the worldwide tax system for some
of those foreign affiliates. Therefore, the response of U.S. multinationals to dividend
exemption could be different (possibly larger) than that of Japanese multination-
als. However, even given those considerations, our findings about the heterogeneous
response depending on the stock of retained earnings are worth noting.
In conclusion, there are several research issues for the future that are worth men-
tioning. First, from the policy point of view, it important to analyze a general equi-
librium effect of dividend exemption, focusing on the potential trade-off between the
decline in tax revenues and the increases in dividend payments; however this issue
is beyond the scope of this paper.33 Second, a focus on foreign direct investment
would be an important extension. Under the new exemption system, because foreign
dividends are exempt from home taxation and Japanese multinationals must pay cor-
porate income taxes only to host country governments, they should be likely to have
more incentive to invest in low-tax countries than they did before April 2009. Because
33See Caves (2007, Chapter 8) for a survey on the welfare effects of taxation.
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foreign direct investment is conducted from mid- to long-term perspectives, to address
these issues, it is imperative that the quality and coverage of firm-affiliate-level panel
data be improved and expanded.
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Table 1.1: Dividend Payments by Foreign Affiliates (in million yen)
year sum mean sd p50 p75 p95 p99 N
2007 1109637 131.29 1552.53 0 11 338 2116 8452
2008 859563 92.10 811.13 0 5 287 1575 9333
2009 1458072 146.86 2296.52 0 2 253 1651 9928
Total 3427272 123.67 1687.13 0 5 293 1731 27713
Table 1.2: Dividend Payments by Foreign Affiliates as a Proportion of Sales
year mean sd p50 p75 p95 p99 N
2007 .0473 1.2753 0 .0055 .0623 .2185 8076
2008 .0264 .7823 0 .0037 .0627 .2004 8871
2009 .0404 1.3320 0 .0025 .0762 .2954 9399
Total .0378 1.1565 0 .0039 .0667 .2451 26346
Table 1.3: Proportion of Foreign Affiliates Paying Dividends
Year Dividend > 0 Dividend = 0 Total Number of Affiliates Proportion
2007 2530 5922 8452 30.0 %
2008 2587 6746 9333 27.7 %
2009 2564 7364 9928 25.8 %
Total 7681 20032 27713 27.7 %
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Table 1.4: Definitions of Variables
Variable Definition
Sales Subsidiary operating revenues without in-
cluding non-operating income
Dividend/Sales Subsidiary dividend payments scaled by sales
Pijct Grossed-up difference between Japanese
statutory tax rate and the subsidiary aver-
age tax rate
wDct Withholding tax rate on dividends
wRct Withholding tax rate on royalties
wIct Withholding tax rate on interest
τijct Average subsidiary tax rate, which is defined
as the corporate tax payment divided by the
pretax profit of subsidiary i
τct Statutory corporate tax rate
Exchangect Exchange rate between Japanese yen and lo-
cal currency, which is normalized to one in
2005
Parent Net Profit/Assets Parent net profit scaled by total assets
Parent Total Debt/Assets Parent total debt (total current and fixed li-
abilities) scaled by total assets
Retained Earning/Sales Subsidiary retained earnings at the end of the
account year scaled by sales
Pre-tax Profit/Sales Subsidiary pretax profit scaled by sales
The subscripts i, j, c, and t intend to indicate the subsidiary,
its parent firm, the country where the subsidiary is located, and
the year, respectively.
Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics
variable mean sd p25 p50 p75 N
Dividend/Sales .0378 1.1565 0 0 .0039 26346
Pijct .2648 .1673 .1660 .3188 .4069 29009
wDct .0672 .0627 0 .1 .1 39034
wRct .0887 .0598 .0525 .1 .1 39011
wIct .1035 .0448 .1 .1 .1 39011
τijct .1574 .1613 0 .1293 .2889 29009
τct .2883 .0702 .25 .2944 .33 39048
Exchangect .9921 .1392 .8832 .9505 1.0664 39105
Parent Net Profit/Assets .0074 .0668 -.0003 .0149 .0337 39031
Parent Total Debt/Assets .5699 .2265 .3995 .5908 .7550 39181
Retained Earning/Sales -.1360 36.8798 -.0098 .0839 .2733 28226
Pre-tax Profit/Sales .0199 5.8587 .0005 .0336 .0914 31981
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Table 1.6: Regressions of the Dividend Equation
Affiliate Dividend Payment/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEt -0.001 -0.001 -0.012
(0.002) (0.008) (0.011)
Pijct -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.126***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
DEt ∗ Pijct -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
wDct -0.066 -0.067 -0.071 -0.063
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.083)
DE ∗ wDct -0.002 -0.023
(0.029) (0.036)
wRct -0.077 -0.079* -0.062 -0.030
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.100)
DEt ∗ wRct 0.050 0.078
(0.048) (0.060)
wIct -0.055 -0.038 -0.023 -0.124
(0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.178)
DEt ∗ wIct -0.077 -0.064
(0.052) (0.064)
τct 0.027 0.015 0.020 -0.030
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.244)
DEt ∗ τct 0.036 0.063*
(0.028) (0.035)
Foreign Exchange Rate 0.005 0.013* 0.002 -0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.035)
Lagged Parent Net Profit/Assets 0.044**
(0.022)
Lagged Parent Total Debt/Assets -0.018***
(0.006)
Constant -0.052* -0.058** -0.051* 0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.130)
Country and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,084 24,084 24,084 12,696
DEt: dummy variable equal to one if t = 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Pijct:
grossed-up difference between Japanese statutory corporate tax rate and the sub-




ct: withholding tax rates on dividends, royalties,
and interest, respectively. τct: statutory tax rate of country c. Robust standard
errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Dividend Payments of Foreign Afffiliates and the Size of the Stock of Re-
tained Earnings
Affiliates with Rijc2009 = 0 Affiliates with Rijc2009 = 1
Year Dividend (million yen) Dividend/Sales Dividend (million yen) Dividend/Sales
2008 33.58 0.00413 180.26 0.0468
2009 43.11 0.00405 318.91 0.0597
This table shows the mean of dividend payments in 2008 and 2009 by foreign affiliates in
each of the two groups (Rijc2009 = 0 and Rijc2009 = 1). Foreign affiliates with Rijc2009 = 0
are those with a stock of retained earnings scaled by sales less than or equal to the median
value in the 2008 sample. Foreign affiliates with Rijc2009 = 1 are those with a stock of
retained earnings scaled by sales greater than the median value in the 2008 sample.
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Table 1.8: Regressions of the Dividend Equation including the Stock of Retained
Earnings
Affiliate Dividend Payments/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEt -0.004 -0.016 -0.017
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Rijct 0.062*** 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Rijct ∗DEt 0.011*** 0.016** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Pijct -0.085*** -0.136*** -0.146*** -0.146***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
DEt ∗ Pijct -0.019** -0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Rijct ∗ Pijct 0.095*** 0.115*** 0.114***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Rijct ∗DEt ∗ Pijct 0.020* -0.016 -0.019
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
wDct -0.113 -0.086 -0.160* -0.157*
(0.078) (0.075) (0.084) (0.085)
DEt ∗ wDct 0.022 0.020
(0.051) (0.051)
Rijct ∗ wDct 0.056 0.055
(0.044) (0.044)
Rijct ∗DEt ∗ wDct -0.047 -0.045
(0.052) (0.053)
wRct -0.027 -0.067 0.017 0.008
(0.097) (0.092) (0.099) (0.101)
DEt ∗ wRct 0.068 0.061
(0.059) (0.059)
wIct -0.047 -0.046 -0.001 -0.004
(0.184) (0.182) (0.186) (0.188)
DEt ∗ wIct -0.070 -0.065
(0.063) (0.064)
τct -0.047 0.112 -0.153 -0.097
(0.236) (0.203) (0.239) (0.243)
DEt ∗ τct 0.046 0.048
(0.035) (0.035)
Foreign Exchange Ratect -0.014 0.016 -0.031 -0.022
(0.033) (0.019) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant -0.012 -0.092 0.069 0.034
(0.125) (0.098) (0.126) (0.128)
Parent Controls Yes Yes No Yes
Country and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,731 11,731 11,881 11,731
Rijct: dummy variable equal to one if the stock of retained earnings scaled by sales
is greater than the median value in the previous year’s sample. Parent controls
include the lagged net profit and the lagged total debt scaled by parent assets.
Robust standard errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
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Table 1.9: Dividend Regression Equation with the Single Tax Price
Affiliate Dividend Payment/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEt -0.033***
(0.005)
Tax Priceijct -0.084*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.115***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
DEt∗Tax Priceijct -0.030** 0.117***
(0.012) (0.023)
wRct -0.064 0.025 -0.069 -0.120
(0.042) (0.078) (0.043) (0.081)
wIct -0.165 -0.187 -0.167 -0.114
(0.108) (0.149) (0.108) (0.148)
τct 0.071*** -0.242 0.058** 0.343*
(0.027) (0.178) (0.027) (0.206)
Foreign Exchange Rate -0.050*** -0.103*** -0.042*** 0.045
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.030)
Lagged Parent Net Profit/Assets 0.047** 0.040*
(0.022) (0.022)
Lagged Parent Total Debt/Assets -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.020 0.199** -0.022 -0.190*
(0.027) (0.087) (0.027) (0.113)
Country and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,998 13,386 24,998 13,386
DEt: dummy variable equal to one if t = 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Tax




ct: withholding tax rates on royalties
and interest, respectively. τct: statutory tax rate of country c. Robust standard
errors clustered by affiliate in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Dividend Regression Equation with the Single Tax Price and the Stock
of Retained Earnings
Affiliate Dividend Payment/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEt -0.019*** -0.043***
(0.004) (0.006)
Rijct 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Rijct ∗DEt 0.013*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.006)
Tax Priceijct -0.057*** -0.096*** -0.066*** -0.140***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
DEt∗Tax Priceijct -0.086*** 0.110***
(0.027) (0.040)
Rijct∗Tax Priceijct 0.064*** 0.118***
(0.012) (0.015)
Rijct ∗DEt∗Tax Priceijct 0.125*** -0.082*
(0.030) (0.047)
wRct -0.031 -0.019 -0.104 -0.094
(0.079) (0.080) (0.082) (0.082)
wIct -0.081 -0.070 -0.029 0.005
(0.169) (0.171) (0.168) (0.173)
τct -0.074 -0.094 0.235 0.237
(0.179) (0.188) (0.206) (0.207)
Foreign Exchange Rate -0.056*** -0.058*** 0.008 0.020
(0.015) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030)
Lagged Parent Net Profit/Assets 0.038* 0.038* 0.036* 0.035
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Lagged Parent Total Debt/Assets 0.009* 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.029 0.051 -0.160 -0.154
(0.087) (0.095) (0.111) (0.112)
Country and Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,243 12,243 12,243 12,243
DEt: dummy variable equal to one if t = 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Rijct:
dummy variable equal to one if the stock of retained earnings scaled by sales is
greater than the median value in the previous year’s sample. Tax Priceijct is the
tax cost on dividends. wRct, w
I
ct: withholding tax rates on royalties and interest,
respectively. τct: statutory tax rate of country c. Robust standard errors clustered
by affiliate in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER II
International Tax Competition over Rate and
Base: Why Do Countries Undertake
Tax-Cut-cum-Base-Broadening Reforms?
2.1 Introduction
Statutory tax rates on corporate incomes of developed countries have fallen sub-
stantially in the last three decades. As Figure 2.1 shows, both the mean and the
median statutory tax rates of OECD countries have consistently declined since 1985
and fell from 48 percent in 1981 to 26 percent in 2010.1 Though the weighted mean
declined more slowly than the median and the mean because countries with large
GDP tend to set higher tax rates, it still decreased from 49 percent in 1981 to 33
percent in 2010. Policy-makers have been concerned that the decline of statutory
tax rates is due to tax competition. The theoretical literature on tax competition
shows that countries set their tax rates at inefficiently low levels, which leads to the
under-provision of public goods (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).
However, in contrast to the clear reductions of corporate tax rates, the size of
corporate tax revenues relative to GDP was quite stable over the same period and
1I obtain information on statutory corporate tax rates and on GDP from the OECD Tax Database
and the World Banks World Development Indicators database, respectively.
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even increased in some measures. Figure 2.2 shows the mean, weighted mean by GDP
and median of corporate tax revenues of OECD countries as a percentage of GDP
from 1980 to 2010.2 Both the mean and median increased as a whole. The mean rose
from 2.3 percent to 2.9 percent and the median raised from 2 percent to 2.7 percent
over the entire period. The weighted mean fluctuated between 2.3 percent and 3.6
percent and remained largely unchanged over the entire period (2.9 percent in 1980
and 2.7 percent in 2010).
As Devereux et al. (2002) summarized, this is mainly because most countries
have broadened corporate tax bases while lowering statutory tax rates (tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening reforms). Kawano and Slemrod (2011) construct unique measures of
corporate tax base changes in OECD countries and find that the probability that a tax
broadening reform is undertaken increases significantly when the corporate tax rate is
decreased. More recently, corporate tax reforms in Japan and the United States call
for tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policies. In 2012, Japan lowered its statutory corpo-
rate tax rate from 30 percent to 25.5 percent (28.05 percent including a temporary tax
increase) and broadened the tax base by lowering the rate of depreciation allowances.
In the U.S., President Obama’s 2012 Framework for Business Tax Reform proposes
lowering the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 28 percent and broadening the tax
base by eliminating business tax loopholes and tax expenditures.
This paper examines the causes of this tendency in corporate tax reforms and the
determinants of corporate tax rate and base changes. For this purpose, I analyze, both
theoretically and empirically, international tax competition over statutory tax rates
and tax bases to attract mobile capital and profits. The tax-competition literature has
exclusively focused on only tax-rate competition, except for Haufler and Schjelderup
(2000), Devereux et al. (2008), Becker and Fuest (2011) and Egger and Raff (2011),
and thus cannot fully explain government decisions over both corporate tax rates and




Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) show that when multinational firms have a op-
portunity to shift their profits across countries through transfer pricing, governments
reduce tax rates and distort firms’ investment decisions by limiting the deductibility
of investment costs from taxable income. In their model, because governments have
fixed revenue requirements from corporate taxation, one of two tax instruments (tax
rate and base) is automatically determined by the revenue requirement condition. De-
vereux et al. (2008) set up a model where governments choose both statutory rates
and the rates of allowance on capital costs independently and calculate the slope of
best response functions of the statutory tax rates and the effective marginal tax rates.
Their theoretical model focuses on the slopes of the best response function to make
predictions on their empirical model. Becker and Fuest (2011) analyze optimal tax
policy regarding tax rate and base in the presence of internationally mobile firms.
They show that if the marginal mobile firm that locate in the home country is more
profitable than the average firm in the country, the government of the home country
sets lower rate of allowance on capital costs compared to the case without the mo-
bility of firms. Egger and Raff (2011) examines the effect of regional integration (a
reduction in trade costs) on corporate tax policy over rate and base.
I advance the literature by working on the comparative statics of the Nash equi-
librium when countries set both their tax rates and bases and identifying under what
conditions and how countries change their tax rates and bases. In my model, an
exogenous number of firms reside in each of two countries. Each firm determines
whether to become a multinational firm by setting up a foreign subsidiary in the
other country, or produce only in the home country. Firms are heterogeneous in the
profitability of foreign direct investment (FDI). Once a firm becomes a multinational,
the firm can engage in income shifting between the two countries to save tax pay-
ments. The tax rate differentials between the two countries affect the choice of a firm
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taking a multinational form and also the amount of income shifting by multinationals.
I find that optimal tax policy crucially depends on the profitability of FDI relative
to the domestic rent in the home country and the distribution of the profitability of
FDI. I show that when the profitability of FDI exogenously increases relative to the
domestic rent in the home country or the cost of setting up a foreign subsidiary
decreases, if the slope of the density function of the profitability is downward sloping
or relatively flat, the country undertakes a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reform. By
contrast, if the slope of the density function of the profitability of FDI is sufficiently
increasing, the country undertakes a tax-increase-cum-base-narrowing reform. I also
find that when the value of intra-firm transactions (in the model, the value of input
goods produced by foreign subsidiaries) increases, the country undertakes a tax-cut-
cum-base-broadening reform.
I also examine the equilibrium tax rate and base in the presence of asymmetry in
country size. The previous literature has demonstrated that larger countries in terms
of population set higher tax rates than smaller countries. The main reason of this
result is that the supply of capital to a large country is less responsive to its tax rate
than smaller countries (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). The tax rate differentials
arising from asymmetric country sizes have been examined under various situations.3
I show that if the domestic rent of a firm is large relative to the amount of income
shifting by multinationals at the symmetric equilibrium, when the size of one of two
countries becomes larger, the larger country sets a higher statutory tax rate and a
higher rate of allowance. By contrast, if the domestic rent is small relative to the
amount of income shifting at the symmetric equilibrium, the larger country sets a
lower statutory tax rate and a lower rate of allowance. This result implies that, in
3See the following papers that analyze the asymmetric country sizes in tax competition models
under the situations such as FDI by a monopolist (Haufler and Wooton, 1999), agglomeration
economies (Baldwin and Krugman, 1999), trade costs and agglomeration economies (Ottaviano and
Ypersele, 2005), firms’ choice of multinational organizational form (Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008),
and heterogenous firms (Davies and Eckel, 2010). These papers show that large countries still set
higher tax rates under the different situations even though the mechanisms are somewhat different.
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addition to the size differences in population, the size of the corporate sector and the
business activities of multinational firms are also important factors to explain tax
rate differentials across countries. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2.2 describes the basic model. Section 2.3 analyzes the comparative statics
of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Section 2.4 provides conclusions.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Basic Setup
There are two countries, country 1 and country 2. In country i (i ∈ {1, 2}), Ni
firms produce outputs using capital inputs with identical technologies in a perfectly
competitive setting. The production function of each firm is given by f(ki), where
f(·) is defined for ki ≥ 0 and ki is the amount of capital used by a firm producing in
country i. f(ki) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous, and continuously
differentiable (f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0) satisfying the Inada conditions f(0) = 0 and
limki↓0 f
′(ki) =∞. Outputs are freely tradable between the two countries. Thus the
price of outputs is normalized to unity in both countries. Capital is freely mobile
between two countries and is infinitely elastically supplied at the world net rate of
return r.
Firms can choose their organizational forms, domestic or multinational. While a
domestic firm operates only in a country of residence, each firm can take a multi-
national form by incurring fixed costs β to set up a foreign subsidiary. Firms are
heterogeneous in the fixed set-up costs. For ease of interpretation, I define α = −β
as a measure of the profitability of foreign direct investment of a multinational firm.
I interpret that lower set-up costs (lower β) implies higher profitability (larger α).
I assume α is continuously distributed following the distribution function G(α) over
the support (−∞, α) for each country, where α > 0.4 The distributions of α in the
4The assumption of α > 0 implies that fixed costs β are negative for some firms. As will be shown
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two countries are identical and independent. Once a firm takes a multinational form,
the firm not only produces domestically in the home country but also can engage in
income shifting through transfer pricing between the parent firm and its subsidiary
to save the corporate tax payments. I denote the proportion of multinational firms
in country i as mi, where 0 ≤ mi ≤ 1. The numbers of multinational and domestic
firms can be expressed as Nimi and Ni(1 −mi), respectively. A firm will choose to
become a multinational if the tax saving from income shifting exceeds β.
The procedures of transfer pricing follows Haufler and Schjelderup (2000). A for-
eign subsidiary in country j (j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j) produces one unit of an input good
with a fixed cost, normalized to zero for notational simplicity, and sell it to its parent
in country i at the price qi. The true price of the input, the “arm’s length price,” is
p for a parent in country i. But the transfer price qi is not costlessly observable for
tax authorities. Thus the subsidiary located in country j can set any price incurring
a transaction cost. I denote the transaction cost as c(qi), where c(·) is a strictly
convex, continuous, and continuously differentiable function with c(p) = c′(p) = 0.
This means that selling the input at the true price is costless for multinational firms
and that the transaction cost increases as the subsidiary overprices (qi > p) or under-
prices (qi < p) more because then it is more likely that the tax authorities could
detect the deviation from the arm’s length price and also multinational firms have to
pay higher fines if tax authorities audit their tax returns.
Each country’s government sets the statutory tax rate on corporate taxable in-
comes (ti) and the rate of allowance on the cost of capital (ai) so as to maximize the
corporate tax revenue, where 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1. The order of decisions is
as follows. First, each country sets the statutory tax rate and the rate of allowance
in subsection 2.2.3, sufficiently large α will need to be assumed to guarantee that some firms with
negative β will choose to engage in FDI even when there is no benefit from income shifting (or, when
the home country’s tax rate is equal or lower than the host country’s tax rate). As Bucovetsky and
Haufler (2008) discuss, this assumption reflect that there are non-tax reasons for firms to determine
their multinational structures. Another interpretation is that there exits some multinational firms
in each country before countries commit to their tax policies.
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simultaneously. Second, given those statutory tax rates and rates of allowance, each
firm chooses whether to take a multinational form by setting up a subsidiary in the
foreign county. Third, both domestic and multinational firms make investment deci-
sions. In addition, multinational firms also choose the price of the input good selling
from the foreign subsidiary to its parent (qi).
2.2.2 Investment and Income-shifting Decisions
The after-tax total profit for a parent in country i and the foreign affiliate in
country j can be written as
πMi = (1− ti)(f(ki)− qi − airki)− (1− ai)rki + (1− tj)qi − c(qi)
= (1− ti)(f(ki)− qi − zirki) + (1− tj)qi − c(qi),
where zi =
1−aiti
1−ti for 0 ≤ ti < 1 and zi − 1 =
ti(1−ai)
1−ti is the effective marginal tax
rate on investment (Devereux et al., 2008).5 The first order conditions for the profit
maximization with respect ki and qi are
∂πMi
∂ki
= (1− ti)(f ′(ki)− zir) = 0, (2.1)
∂πMi
∂qi
= ti − tj − c′(qi) = 0. (2.2)
For 0 ≤ ti < 1, equation (2.1) implies f ′(ki) = zir. Solving that equation for ki
implicitly defines the demand function of capital with respect to zi as ki = k(zi). The
effect of the effective marginal tax rate on the demand function of capital can become





5I assume that the transaction cost and the set-up cost are not tax deductible.
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which implies that a higher effective marginal tax rate decreases the demand for
capital of the parent firm in country i. Equation (2.2) implicitly defines the amount
of income shifting from the parent in country i to its subsidiary in country j such
that qi = qi(τi), where qi is the inverse function of c
′(qi) and τi = ti− tj. This implies
that the income shifting from country i to country j depends only on the tax rate
differential between country i and country j. Totally differentiating equation (2.2)













which implies that more (less) income will flow out from country i into country j when
the statutory tax rate of country i (j) goes up. Domestic firms in country i demand
the same amount of capital as k(zi), but they cannot shift their profits between the
two countries. The profit function of domestic firms in country i can be written as
πDi = (1− ti) (f (k(zi))− zirk(zi)) .
2.2.3 Choice of Taking a Multinational Form
A firm in country i chooses to take a multinational form if and only if doing so
is more profitable than operating only domestically when taking into account fixed
costs β to set up a subsidiary: πMi − πDi ≥ β, which yields
τiqi − c(qi) + α ≥ 0.
Assuming the interior solution, where some firms become multinationals, the firm
in country i with α∗i such that α
∗
i = − (τiqi − c(qi)) is indifferent between becoming
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a multinational or not. Then firms with α ≥ α∗i become multinationals. I assume
the upper bound of α is sufficiently large so that α > α∗i to guarantee an interior
solution for α∗i . Thus, the proportion of multinational firms can be determined as
mi = 1−G(α∗i ). Note that because qi depends on the statutory tax rate differentials
τi, mi also depends on τi and can be written as a function of τi: mi = mi(τi).
Taking a derivative of mi with respect to τi yields
m′i(τi) = −G′(α∗i )
dα∗i
dτi
= G′(α∗i )qi > 0. (2.3)
We used equation (2.2) to derive dα∗i /dτi = −qi. Condition (2.3) implies that as
the tax rate differential between country i and country j becomes larger, more firms
choose to engage in FDI because then they can get more benefits (tax saving) from
income shifting.
2.2.4 Optimal Tax Rate and Base
I assume that each country set the statutory tax rate and the rate of allowance so
as to maximize the corporate tax revenue. Following Devereux et al. (2008), I define
the rent from production of a firm in country i as π̂(zi) = maxki(f(ki) − zirki) > 0,
which is the tax base for the statutory tax rate ti but does not depend on ti given
zi. The envelope theorem implies that the rent is decreasing in the effective marginal
tax rate zi: π̂
′(zi) = −rk(zi). The country i’s government revenue can be written as
Ri = Ni(1−mi) [ti (f (k(zi))− airk(zi))] +Nimi [ti (f (k(zi))− qi − airk(zi))] + tiNjmjqj
= Ni (tiπ̂(zi) + (zi − 1)rk(zi))− tiNimiqi + tiNjmjqj. (2.4)
By the definition of the effective marginal tax rate zi − 1 = ti(1−ai)1−ti , for each
country’s government, choosing independently the statutory rate ti and the rate of
deductibility for capital cost ai is equivalent to choosing the statutory tax rate ti and
45
the effective marginal tax rate (zi−1) separately. Therefore, I characterize the optimal
tax policy over (ti, zi) and then translate it into the tax policy over (ti, ai) at Nash
equilibria.
Assuming the interior solutions, 0 < ti < 1 and zi > 1 (or 0 < ai < 1), the
first order conditions for the revenue maximization problem implies that country
i sets ti and zi so that both the marginal revenue of increasing the statutory tax













= Ni ((1− ti)rk(zi) + (zi − 1)rk′(zi)) = 0. (2.6)




= −2(Nimiq′i +Njmjq′j)− tiNimiq′′i + tiNjmjq′′j









= Ni ((2− ti)rk′(zi) + (zi − 1)rk′′(zi)) . (2.9)
In what follows, I assume the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium such that
Ni = Nj = N , ti = tj = t, and zi = zj = z. At the symmetric Nash equilibrium,
qi = qj = p from equation (2.2), and c
′(p) = 0 and mi(0) = mj(0) = m because
τi = τj = 0. Evaluating the second derivatives (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) at the symmetric
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 −4N (mq′(0) +G′(α∗)p2) −Nrk(z)
−Nrk(z) N ((2− t)rk′(z) + (z − 1)rk′′(z))
 .
(2.10)







Rzz = N ((2− t)rk′(z) + (z − 1)rk′′(z)) < 0, (2.12)
|H| = RttRzz −RtzRzt > 0, (2.13)
where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian H. Condition (2.11) holds because
q′i(τi) = 1/c
′′(qi) > 0. Condition (2.12) requires k
′′(z) ≥ 0, or that the absolute value
of k′(z) < 0 is sufficiently large, which means that the elasticity of capital demand is






Condition (2.13) can be rewritten as




, where εI =
t
p




where εI is the elasticity of income shifting and εM is the elasticity of the number of
multinationals in country i with respect to the statutory tax rate ti at the symmetric








m′(τi). Condition (2.14) implies that the amount of income
shifting and the decision on becoming a multinational firm are sufficiently responsive
to the tax rate differential. To guarantee the second order conditions at the symmetric
Nash equilibrium, I impose those assumption described above on the production
function and the transaction cost function so that both conditions (2.12) and (2.13)
hold.
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I calculate the slope of the best response functions at the symmetric equilibrium.
The total differentiation of the first order conditions (2.5) and (2.6) with respect to







 −2N (mq′(0) +G′(α∗)p2)
0
 .













Equation (2.15) and (2.16) imply that, as Devereux et al. (2008) showed, the
statutory tax rates ti and tj are strategic complements and that the effective marginal
tax rate of country i, (zi − 1), and the statutory tax rate of country j are strategic
substitutes. The total differentiation of the first order conditions (2.5) and (2.6) with





= 0. This implies that neither the statutory
tax rate nor the effective marginal tax rate responds directly to the effective marginal
tax rate of the other country. This result comes from the assumption that capital is
infinitely elastically supplied at the world capital market at the fixed rate of return
r.6
2.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, I analyze the comparative statics of the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium. I examine the effects on the tax policies of the two countries of changes in the
6In Devereux et al. (2008), the rate of return is endogenously determined so that capital demand
and fixed capital supply are balanced. Then countries respond to the effective marginal tax rate to
each other, though the slopes of the best responses ∂ti/∂zj and ∂zi/∂zj cannot be signed analytically.
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following four parameters in the model: (1) an exogenous increase in the profitability
of foreign direct investment (FDI), (2) an exogenous increase in the domestic rent, (3)
an exogenous increase in the value of input goods produced by foreign subsidiaries,
and (4) the asymmetry in the size of the corporate sector between the two countries.
2.3.1 Increase in the profitability of FDI
Suppose that the profits from FDI exogenously increases for all parent firms in
country i in the sense that the distribution function of α shifts to the right along the
horizontal axis by αi ≥ 0 in country i. This changes the distribution function of α
from G(α) to G(α − αi). I examine the effect of an increase in αi on tax policies
evaluating at αi = 0. By the definition of α = −β, this effect is essentially equivalent
to that of an decrease in the fixed costs of setting up a foreign subsidiary (β). I
establish the following proposition.
Proposition II.1. Suppose that the profitability of FDI increases for parent firms in
country i at the symmetric equilibrium. Then, (i) country i sets a lower statutory
tax rate, a higher effective marginal tax rate, and a lower rate of allowance than
country j. The tax rate differentials is smaller as the sum of the elasticity of income
shifting and that of becoming a multinational (εI + εM) is larger. (ii) If G′′ < 0 or
the absolute value of G′′ is small, country i undertakes a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening
policy. (iii) If G′′ > 0 and the absolute value of G′′ is large, both countries undertake
tax-increase-cum-base-narrowing policies.
Proof. The total differentiation of the two first order conditions for country i, equa-
tions (2.5) and (2.6), and the two first order conditions for country j with respect to
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ti, tj, zi, zj, and αi at the symmetric equilibrium yields

Rtt Rtz 2N (mq
′ +G′p2) 0
Rzt Rzz 0 0
2N (mq′ +G′p2) 0 Rtt Rtz










N (p+ tq′)G′ − tp2NG′′
0




We denote Π as follows.
Π =

Rtt Rtz 2N (mq
′ +G′p2) 0
Rzt Rzz 0 0
2N (mq′ +G′p2) 0 Rtt Rtz
0 0 Rzt Rzz

.
Note that all the derivatives with respect to αi are evaluated at αi = 0. Solving
























where |Π| is the determinant of Π and
Ω1 = |H|
(

















(p+ tq′)G′ − tp2G′′
)
Rzz.
I first look at the changes of the differentials (ti− tj) and (zi− zj) by subtracting



























. The denominators of the above expressions










Thus, the tax differential (ti − tj) and (zi − zj) is smaller in absolute value as(
εI + εM
)
is larger. This complete the proof of part (i) of this proposition.
To fix signs in the comparative statics, I assume that the symmetric equilibrium
is locally strictly stable. One of the necessary conditions for stability imply that the
determinant of Π is positive: |Π| > 0 (see the proof in Appendix B). |Π| can be
expressed as





















Because |H| > 0 from condition (2.13) and Rzz < 0, |Π| > 0 implies |H| −
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Rzz −R2tz > 0,





This condition implies that the business activities of multinationals are sufficiently
responsive to the statutory tax rates in the sense that the sum of the elasticity of
income shifting and that of taking a multinational form is large enough so that εI +
εM > −tR2tz/(2NmpRzz) holds at the symmetric equilibrium.
































Note p > 0, G′ ≥ 0, q′ > 0, t > 0. Therefore, if G′′ < 0, or G′′ > 0 but the absolute
value is small, equation (2.23) is positive and this yields ∂ti
∂αi
< 0. By contrast, if G′′











> 0 because (|H| − 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz) > (|H|+ 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz) >
0.
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Because |H| − 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz > |H| + 2N (mq′G′ +G′p2)Rzz > 0, if G′′ is










Ω2 > 0 and so
dtj
dαi
< 0. If G′′ is positive and sufficiently large so that
tq′G′ − tp2G′′ < 0⇐⇒ G′′/G′ > q′/p2,
Ω2 < 0 and so
∂ti
∂αi
> 0. The signs of ∂zi/∂αi and ∂zj/∂αi are opposite to those of
∂ti/∂αi and ∂tj/∂αi, respectively. Finally, I complete the proof by noting that by
definition of zi: zi − 1 = ti(1−ai)1−ti , higher ti and lower zi implies higher ai and that
lower ti and higher zi implies lower ai.
The intuition of Proposition II.1 is as follows. Note that when the profitability
of FDI increases or the fixed costs of setting up a foreign subsidiary decreases for
parent firms in country i, two effects come in. First, given any tax policies of the two
countries, parent firms in country i have more incentive to engage in FDI because
doing so is more profitable or less costly. Second, with the increase in the profitability
of FDI or the decrease in the costs of taking a multinational form, the responsiveness
of the number of multinationals to the tax statutory tax rates also changes. These two
effects can be clearly shown by differentiating the marginal revenue of the statutory
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tax rate (MRSTi) with respect to αi:
∂MRSTi
∂αi
= −Ni (qi + tiq′i)G′(α∗i ) + tiNiq2iG′′(α∗i ). (2.24)
The first term in the above equation is negative and corresponds to the first effect.
When more firms become multinationals, the marginal revenue of the statutory tax
rate goes down. This is because when more multinationals engage in income shifting,
increasing the statutory tax rate would make larger revenue losses from their income
shifting from country i to country j. The second effect, the change in the effect of the
tax rate differential on the number of multinationals, corresponds to the second term
of equation (2.24). This term comes from the derivative of (−tiNiqim′i) in equation
(2.5), which is change in the marginal revenue loss from higher tax rates inducing more
multinationals. The sign of this term depends on the slope of the density function of
αi, G
′′(α∗i ).
If the slope of the density function of the profitability is downward sloping or
relatively flat (G′′ < 0 or the absolute value of G′′ is small), the first term dominates
the second term in equation (2.24) and thus ∂MRSTi
∂αi
< 0. Then MRSTi goes down
given any tax policy (ti, zi) and because MRSTi is decreasing in ti at the symmetric
equilibrium by the second order condition for the revenue maximization problem
(2.11), country i has incentive to lower its statutory tax rate. With lower statutory
tax rates, the marginal revenue of the effective marginal tax rate (MRETi) in equation
(2.6) goes up for any zi. Then, noting that MRETi is decreasing in zi from the second
order condition (2.12), the country i has incentive to increase the effective marginal
tax rate. Therefore, the government of country i raises corporate revenues more
effectively by lowering the statutory tax rate and increasing the effective marginal
tax rate with a broader tax base (a lower rate of allowance).
By contrast, if the slope of the density function of the profitability of FDI is
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sufficiently increasing (G′′ > 0 and the absolute value of G′′ is large), the second term
(positive) dominates the first term in equation (2.24). Then with higher αi, MRSTi
goes up given any tax policy (ti, zi) and has incentive to increase the statutory tax
rate. With higher statutory tax rates, MRETi goes down for any zi. Thus the
government raise revenues more effectively by increasing the statutory tax rate and
lowering the effective marginal tax rate with a narrower tax base (a higher rate of
allowance).
2.3.2 Increase in the domestic rent
Proposition II.1 demonstrates that the profitability of FDI and its distribution
affect the optimal tax policy over tax rate and base. This subsection examines the
effect of a change in the profitability in the home country on optimal tax policy.
Suppose that the domestic rent in country i (π̂i) increases exogenously, for example,
with higher productivity of production or a positive demand shock. Then I establish
the following proposition.
Proposition II.2. When the domestic rent from production increases in country i at
the symmetric equilibrium, county i sets a higher statutory tax rate, a lower effective
marginal tax rate, and a higher rate of allowance than country j, and both countries
undertake tax-rate-increase-cum-base-narrowing policies.
Proof. The total differentiation of the two first order conditions for country i, equa-
tions (2.5) and (2.6), and the two first order conditions for country j with respect to
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ti, tj, zi, zj, and π̂i at the symmetric equilibrium yields

Rtt Rtz 2N (mq
′ +G′p2) 0
Rzt Rzz 0 0
2N (mq′ +G′p2) 0 Rtt Rtz










































The changes in the differentials (ti−tj) and (zi−zj) can be obtained by subtracting














|H| − 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz
< 0.
Note that the size of the domestic rent does not affect the number of multinationals
and their income shifting behavior. Thus, when the domestic rent increases in country
i, the government of country i raises more revenues by increasing the tax rate on the
rent (ti). In addition, (2.6) implies that with higher statutory tax rates, MRETi goes
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up for any zi. Thus country i will increase the tax rate on the rent while narrowing
the tax base with a lower effective marginal tax rate and a higher rate of allowance.
Propositions II.1 and II.2 suggest that the profitability of FDI increases rela-
tively more than the domestic rent in the home country, the country will undertake
a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reform. We can also interpret that a country with
multinational firms whose foreign affiliates are relatively more profitable will set a
lower statutory tax rate and a broader tax base compared to other countries.
2.3.3 Increase in the value of input goods produced by foreign sub-
sidiaries
In the current model, the amount of income shifting from a parent in country i to
its subsidiary in country j (qi) does not affect the pre-tax total profit for the parent
and its subsidiary. In other words, qi determines the distribution of reported taxable
incomes of multinational firms between the two countries. Because the cost function
of income shifting c (qi) is strictly convex and increasing with c(p) = c
′(p) = 0,
an exogenous increase in the value (or the arm’s length price) of input good (p)
would affect qi, which also would affect tax policies of the two countries at the Nash
equilibrium. To focus on the effect of a marginal change in p without changing the
shape of the cost function c(qi), I consider that the the value of input goods increases
by pi so that the cost function shifts to the right by pi from c(qi) to c(qi − pi). Then
I examines derivatives of c(qi − pi) with respect to pi at the symmetric equilibrium
(pi = 0). Then I establish the following proposition.
Proposition II.3. When the value of the input good sold by a foreign subsidiary in
country j to its parent in country i increases at the symmetric equilibrium, county i
sets a lower statutory tax rate, a higher effective marginal tax rate, and a lower rate of
allowance than country j, and both countries undertake tax-cut-cum-base-broadening
policies.
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Proof. Differentiating with respect to pi the first order condition to determine qi:










= 1 (also ∂
2qi
∂p2i
= 0). This implies the amount of income shifting in-
creases by the same amount as an increase in the value of input goods. Differentiating











= 0 (also, ∂
2mi
∂p2i
= 0). This implies that an increase in the value of input
goods does not affect firms’ decisions on taking a multinational form at the symmetric
equilibrium.
Given those derivatives, the total differentiation of the two first order conditions
for country i, equations (2.5) and (2.6), and the two first order conditions for country
j with respect to ti, tj, zi, zj, and pi at the symmetric equilibrium yields

Rtt Rtz 2N (mq
′ +G′p2) 0
Rzt Rzz 0 0
2N (mq′ +G′p2) 0 Rtt Rtz









































2N2(m+ tG′p) (mq′ +G′p2)RtzRzz
|Π|
> 0. (2.34)
The changes in the differentials (ti−tj) and (zi−zj) can be obtained by subtracting















|H| − 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz
> 0.
Note again that at the symmetric equilibrium, a marginal increase in pi does not
change the number of multinationals in either country. When the true price of input
goods increases, the amount of income shifting by a foreign subsidiary in country j
increases by the same amount as ∂qi
∂pi
= 1 indicates. Then MRSTi goes down and
revenue losses from increasing the statutory tax rate becomes large for country i.
Thus country i will cut the tax rate and also broadens the tax base because the tax
rate and base are substitute in the current model as explained above. The proposition
suggests that when more profits are shifted to foreign countries or when the value of
intra-firm transaction increases, the home country undertakes a tax-cut-cum-base-
broadening reform.
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2.3.4 Asymmetry in the size of the corporate sectors
The previous literature on tax competition has examined how an asymmetry in
country size affects equilibrium tax rates. One of the main results is that larger
countries in terms of population set higher tax rates than smaller countries because
the supply of capital to larger countries is less responsive to its tax rate than smaller
countries. In the current model, though population size is not explicitly taken into
account, the total number of firms Ni reflects the size of the corporate sector and
the gross domestic product (GDP) of country i. I examine how the asymmetry in
the size of the corporate sector affects the optimal tax rates and bases. To highlight
the asymmetry in Ni and Nj, I take the total derivatives with respect to Ni and
Nj holding the total number of firms in the world constant: Ni + Nj = N . Then I
establish the following proposition.
Proposition II.4. If the domestic rent of a firm is large relative to the amount of
income shifting by multinationals (π̂ > 2mp) at the symmetric equilibrium, when the
size of one of two countries becomes larger, the larger country sets a higher statutory
tax rate, a lower effective marginal tax rate, and a higher rate of allowance. If the
domestic rent of a firm is small relative to the amount of income shifting by multi-
nationals (π̂ < 2mp) at the symmetric equilibrium, the larger country sets a lower
statutory tax rate, a higher effective marginal tax rate, and a lower rate of allowance.
Proof. The total differentiation of the two first order conditions for country i, equa-
tions (2.5) and (2.6), and the two first order conditions for country j with respect to
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ti, tj, zi, zj, Ni and Nj such that dNj = −dNi at the symmetric equilibrium yields

Rtt Rtz 2N (mq
′ +G′p2) 0
Rzt Rzz 0 0
2N (mq′ +G′p2) 0 Rtt Rtz


















































|H| − 2N (mq′ +G′p2)Rzz
.
Thus if π̂ ≷ 2mp, ∂ti
∂Ni
≷ 0 and ∂tj
∂Ni
≶ 0 hold. Noting that the signs of ∂zi/∂Ni
and ∂zj/∂Ni are opposite to those of ∂ti/∂Ni and ∂tj/∂Ni, respectively, I complete
the proof.
When the total number of firms increases, both the number of domestic firms and
that of multinational firms increases keeping the proportion of multinationals un-
changed. Because each government of the two countries has the two tax instruments,
the statutory tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate (or, the rate of allowance on
capital cost), the government chooses whether to raise more revenues by increasing
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the tax rate on the rent (ti) or on capital (zi).
If the rent is relatively larger than the amount of income shifting by multina-
tionals at the symmetric equilibrium (π̂ > 2mp), the government would need to care
less about revenue losses induced by multinationals’ income shifting and has more
incentive to raise revenues by raising the statutory tax rate on the rent. Thus the
government chooses to increase the statutory tax rate while narrowing the tax base
with a higher rate of allowance.
By contrast, if the rent is relatively smaller than the amount of income shifting by
multinationals (π̂ < 2mp) at the symmetric equilibrium, a higher corporate tax rate
would induce multinationals to shift a large amount of incomes to the other country.
Thus the government has no incentive to raise the statutory tax rate. Instead, the
government will raise more revenue by lowering the statutory tax rate (caring about
income shifting by multinationals) while broadening the tax base with a lower rate
of allowance.
This result is comparable to those of previous studies. Starting from Bucovetsky
(1991) and Wilson (1991), the literature has demonstrated that larger countries set
higher tax rates in Nash equilibrium. Because country size is usually measure by pop-
ulation in the literature, the results in Proposition II.4 cannot be directly compared
to those of Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). However the size of the corporate
sector, or the total number of firms, is a reasonable measure of country size in the
current model. Proposition II.4 suggests that a larger country could set a lower tax
rate depending on the relative importance of domestic profitability to foreign busi-
ness activities of multinationals. The proposition also suggests that, in addition to
the differences in population, the size of the corporate sector and the intensity of the
business activities of multinational firms are also important factors to explain tax
rate differentials across countries.
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2.4 Conclusions
Corporate tax reforms of OECD countries have tended to include both statutory
rate reductions and base broadening (tax-cut-cum-base-broadening reforms). To an-
alyze the causes of this tendency and the determinants of corporate tax rate and
base changes, this paper develops the model of international tax competition over
statutory tax rates and the rates of allowance on capital cost. I find that optimal tax
policy crucially depends on the profitability of foreign direct investment (FDI) rela-
tive to the domestic rent in the home country and the distribution of the profitability
of FDI. Propositions II.1 and II.2 suggest that countries undertake tax-cut-cum-base-
broadening policies when the profitability of FDI increases relatively more than the
domestic rent. When the profitability of FDI increases or the cost of setting up a for-
eign subsidiary decreases, more firms would like to engage in FDI. Then the marginal
revenue of the statutory tax rate goes down and the marginal revenue of the effec-
tive marginal tax rate goes up with lower statutory tax rates. Thus the government
raises corporate tax revenues more effectively by lowering the statutory tax rate and
broadening the tax base with a lower rate of allowance.
My analysis also sheds light on the equilibrium tax rates and bases in the presence
of asymmetric country size. Proposition II.4 shows that the asymmetry in the size
of the corporate sector affects optimal tax policy differently depending on whether
the domestic rent is relatively larger than the amount of income shifting by multina-
tionals or not. With the two tax instruments, the statutory tax rate and the rate of
allowance on capital cost, the government can choose whether to raise more revenue
by increasing the tax rate on the rent or on capital. If the rent is relatively larger than
the amount of income shifting by multinationals, increasing the tax rate on the rent
is more effective way to raise revenues than taxing more on capital. Then the govern-
ment chooses to increase the statutory tax rate while narrowing the tax base with a
higher rate of allowance. The reverse is true if the rent is relatively smaller than the
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amount of income shifting. These results imply that in addition to the differences in
population, the size of the corporate sector and the intensity of the business activities
of multinational firms are also important factors to explain the tax rate differentials
across countries.
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Figure 2.1: Mean, Weighted Mean by GDP, and Median of Statutory Tax Rates of
OECD Countries, 1981-2010
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Figure 2.2: Mean, Weighted Mean by GDP, and Median of Corporate Tax Revenues
of OECD Countries as a Proportion of GDP, 1980-2010
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CHAPTER III
Cap-and-Trade Programs under Delayed
Compliance: Consequences of Interim Injections of
Permits
3.1 Introduction
Cap-and-trade programs are being utilized as the main vehicle to combat global
warming by national and state governments of advanced countries. Such regulations
are sometimes exceedingly complex. Nonetheless they share some common features.
First, although firms subject to the regulations are required to surrender permits to
cover their carbon emissions, they are not required to surrender permits on a continu-
ing basis (“continual compliance”) but only periodically. As a result, a firm may emit
carbon without possessing the permits to cover its emissions as long as it acquires
sufficient permits by the compliance date. We refer to this aspect of the regulations
as “delayed compliance.” In the case of the California law (AB-32), for example, the
compliance period is initially two years and subsequently three years (although a frac-
tion of the permits must be surrendered earlier as a down-payment). In the case of
the three federal bills that failed to become law, the compliance period was one year.1
1Waxman-Markey’s “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,”, Kerry-Boxer’s “Clean
Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009,” and Kerry-Lieberman’s “American Power Act of
2010.”
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Second, while some permits are issued at the outset of a compliance period, provi-
sion is made in most recent proposals for the government to inject additional permits
into the market later in the compliance period.2 Third, while permits may be stored
(“banked”) over time for later use, these programs prohibit or severely restrict the
opportunity to borrow from future allocations. For example, California AB-32 allows
unlimited banking and prohibits borrowing from the future compliance periods.
These common features have consequences that have escaped notice. Virtually all
previous analyses have assumed that firms must be in continual compliance.3 Under
this assumption, a sizable literature has developed to assess the welfare benefits of
holding back some of the permits that could have been allocated at the outset and
using them subsequently to hold down the price through auctions or sales at fixed
prices. Such policies are classified as “price collars” or “safety valves.”4 Burtraw et al.
(2010) find that a price collar (also called a “symmetric safety valve” in the paper)
outperforms a safety valve in a static setting. Fell and Morgenstern (2010) and Fell
et al. (2012) simulate a dynamic stochastic model of a cap-and-trade program with
a price collar or a safety valve.5 Fell and Morgenstern (2010) find that price collar
2We do not discuss the European trading program since it has no interim injections during its
annual compliance period. However, such injections have been proposed. Stavins (2012) regards
the absence of a safety valve or price collar in the European system as a “design flaw” and Hone
(2012) notes that “One approach is...to [require] a sufficient proportion of allowances to be auc-
tioned, instead of being allocated free of charge and auctions to be held periodically throughout the
commitment period. It is too late to do this for Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2020) but it could
be introduced as part of the expected legislative process to set the parameters for Phase IV (2021
and beyond, probably extending to 2030).”
3The single exception is the contemporaneous working paper of Holland and Moore (2012), which
complements our work. They consider a wide variety of cap-and-trade programs, including the
carbon-trading programs of primary concern to us. After classifying these programs in terms of
their compliance timing, banking, and borrowing provisions, Holland and Moore provide a sufficient
condition for delayed and continual compliance to yield the same equilibrium price path. Although
their sufficient condition holds in programs to limit SOx and NOx (e.g. RECLAIM and the Acid
Rain Program), their condition is violated in all four of the carbon-trading programs we analyze as
they acknowledge when discussing our work.
4For a valuable explanation of the origins of the safety valve concept and its evolution in the
climate context, see Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).
5In a dynamic context, intertemporal trading of emissions permits matters for economic efficiency.
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Rubin (1996) show that emissions trading allowing banking and
borrowing of emission permits achieves the least-cost outcome.
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mechanisms are more cost-effective than both purely quantity-based mechanisms and
safety valve mechanisms for a given level of expected cumulative emissions. They also
find that the combination of a price collar with banking and borrowing systems can
achieve expected cost as low as a tax with lower emissions variance. Fell et al. (2012)
find that hard collars, which ensure unlimited supply of reserve allowances to defend
a ceiling price yield lower net present value of expected abatement costs than soft
collars, price collars with limited supply of reserve allowances, for the same level of
the expected cumulative emissions net of offsets. Most recently, Hasegawa and Salant
(2012) have shown that if firms must cover their emissions on a continuing basis,
then in the competitive equilibrium, the price path of permits may remain constant
over periods while the government is selling additional permits at a ceiling price or
may even collapse in response to a government auction. Clearly, no rational private
agent would hold permits in the face of such capital losses. But the government sales
of additional permits would enable firms to acquire the necessary permits to remain
continually in compliance.6
Despite this sizable literature analyzing the effects of permit auctions and sales
under a regime of continual compliance, such policies remain to be investigated under
the actual regime of delayed compliance. With delayed compliance, firms purchase
the permits they will ultimately need only at those instants within the compliance
period when the permit price has the lowest capitalized value at the compliance date.
Much of the literature assumes discrete time and defines the period length in
a way that obscures the distinction between delayed compliance and “contempora-
neous” (the discrete-time analog of “continual”) compliance. To understand this
distinction, consider a discrete-time model where one period represents one day. If
6If unlimited “borrowing” were permitted, such price drops would not occur since permits could
be borrowed from a future low-price period and sold earlier at a higher price. We assume here that
a firm cannot borrow permits it expects to acquire in the future to cover current emissions under
continual compliance. A distinction between delayed and continual compliance would remain even
if borrowing was allowed provided it was constrained enough that the constraint on it was binding.
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the government will inject permits on some of the days within the next year, the pol-
icy of requiring that permits be surrendered every day to match that day’s emissions
(“contemporaneous compliance”) differs from the policy of requiring that permits be
surrendered once every 365 days to cover cumulative emissions during the entire year.
If, as in most of the discrete-time literature, the length of each period is defined to be
the same as the length of the compliance period, nothing by definition can happen
between periods and, by this modeling choice, one prevents oneself from investigating
the consequences of a government injection of permits between one compliance date
and the next. To consider the effects of government policies conducted within a com-
pliance period, we adopt a continuous-time formulation as less cumbersome than its
discrete-time counterpart.
In contrast to the case of continual compliance, under delayed compliance prices
can never rise slower than the rate of interest. For suppose the contrary. Then the
highest capitalized price would strictly exceed the lowest capitalized price. But then
everyone with an initial allocation of permits would want to sell them at the highest
capitalized price and there would be no one on the other side of the market willing
to buy permits at that price; as a result, there would be massive excess supply.7
Under both compliance regimes, prices can never rise faster than the rate of interest
in the absence of uncertainty; otherwise traders would attempt to buy low and sell
high on an infinite scale. It follows that in any equilibrium under delayed compliance,
prices must rise throughout the compliance period at the rate of interest. Anticipated
government auctions or sales from a finite reserve at a fixed price will not slow this
rate of price appreciation although, as we will show, they will determine the position
of the price path or, equivalently, the permit price prevailing at the compliance date.
The equilibrium permit price at the compliance date equates the demand for
7This argument implicitly assumes that private agents are the only purchasers of permits. We
assume that the government never purchases permits since none of the delayed compliance programs
we consider envision that. If the government did purchase permits, the equilibrium price path under
delayed compliance could rise slower than the rate of interest.
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permits required to cover the cumulative emissions which have occurred since the last
compliance date with the cumulative supply of permits provided by the government
over that period.8 The following algorithm can then be used to determine the permit
price at the compliance date.
For each possible terminal price, determine the (unique) associated price path
over the compliance period. To determine the cumulative demand for permits along
that path, note that at every instant firms will abate up to the point where their
marginal cost of abatement capitalized to the compliance date equals the permit price
anticipated to prevail at that date. Compute the aggregate cumulative emissions of
the regulated entities over time. Firms will need a matching number of permits at the
compliance date. This procedure provides one price-quantity pair on the cumulative
demand curve for permits. Repeat the procedure to generate the other points on the
demand curve.9
Deriving the cumulative supply of permits as a function of the terminal price is
somewhat trickier. Since all prices on each associated price path will have the same
capitalized value, private agents will not care when they sell as long as they hold
zero permits after the compliance period ends. Hence cumulative supply of permits
over the period will consist of the initial allocations plus the subsequent injections of
additional permits. These injections depend on the fine details of particular regula-
tions as we will illustrate using provisions from California’s cap-and-trade program
8As an analytical simplification, we assume that it is illegal or unprofitable to carry permits
from one compliance period to the next. The following algorithm can then be used to determine
the permit price at the compliance date. However, the algorithm in the text is easily modified if
carryovers between compliance periods is permitted.
9To simplify the exposition, we assume that firms do not abate by investing in new or altered
technology. Otherwise a firm’s current abatement decision would affect its future cost of emissions,
and each firm would have a dynamic investment problem to solve. Accounting for this would
complicate the derivation of cumulative emissions if the permit price rises at the rate of interest and
hence the aggregate cumulative demand for permits, but it would not alter any of our points. The
equilibrium price path under delayed compliance would still be determined at a terminal price that
equates cumulative supply to the altered cumulative demand, and this path would fail to equilibrate
markets under continual compliance for the reasons we discuss. We have chosen, therefore, to
abstract from this real world complication. As noted in the concluding section, one cannot abstract
from this complication when conducting welfare analysis.
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AB-32 which begins later this year and from the three Congressional bills which died
in Congress. All four programs envision an initial allocation of permits supplemented
by subsequent injections of additional permits during the compliance period. The
programs differ, however, in the rules governing these injections. For example, while
all these programs prescribe a periodic sequence of auctions with pre-announced re-
serve prices, the programs differ in whether permits unsold in one auction can be
re-offered in subsequent auctions. As we show, California AB-32 has a troublesome
provision for offering unsold permits in subsequent auctions that induces a jump in
the supply of permits; under this rule, there may be no price path that will clear the
permit market.
In addition to auctions, the programs envision sales at pre-determined prices;
but here too the terms of these sales differ. The California plan contemplates sales of
specified amounts at specified prices from an “Allowance Price Containment Reserve”
shortly after each quarterly auction whereas the Kerry-Lieberman (2010) bill proposed
sales of permits at a fixed price over a designated time interval or until the “Cost
Containment Reserve” was depleted.
In the next section, we discuss the determination of cumulative demand for permits
as a function of the last price on a price path rising at the rate of interest. We then
discuss the cumulative supply of permits as a function of the last price on that path.
We show how the supply curve depends on the particular provisions of the emissions
trading program. The last price on the equilibrium price path is determined by the
intersection of the cumulative demand and supply curves. We will also note when
the equilibrium price path under continual compliance differs from the path under
delayed compliance. Such differences occur when firms would not receive injections
of permits soon enough to surrender them under continual compliance. In such cases,
excess demand occurs and permit prices must initially be higher (and emissions per
unit time initially lower) under continual compliance.
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3.2 Preliminaries
Under delayed compliance, firms will purchase permits at the lowest price, cap-
italized to the date of compliance. Since, as explained previously, the equilibrium
price path under delayed compliance must rise at the rate of interest, every price is
lowest and we may index such paths by the price expected to prevail at the date of
compliance. Denote that price as P.
We assume that firm i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) can reduce its emissions per unit time to
ei(t) at time t by abating at cost ci(ei(t)), where firm i’s cost is a strictly decreasing,
strictly convex, differentiable function of emissions. To avoid corners, we assume the
Inada condition holds: −c′i(e)→∞ as e→ 0. Moreover, at a sufficiently high level of
emissions (“baseline emissions,” ēi), the firm’s cost declines to zero and approaches
that level at a zero slope: ci(ēi) = c
′
i(ēi) = 0. Then firm i chooses its emissions
path ei(t) to minimize its total cost of complying with the cap-and-trade regulation.
It minimizes ci(ei(t))e
r(T−t) + ei(t)P, where T is the compliance date. Its optimal
emissions path therefore solves:
−c′i(ei(t)) = Per(t−T ), for t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, . . . n. (3.1)
Given the properties of the n cost functions, the emissions of each firm at any
instant are a continuous, strictly decreasing function of P. From the emissions paths
of the firms, we can determine the cumulative aggregate demand for permits through






ei(t)dt for τ ∈ [0, T ]. (3.2)
D(P, τ) is continuous, strictly decreasing in its first argument and strictly increasing
and strictly concave in its second argument. The intercepts are D(P, 0) = 0 and
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D(0, τ) = τ
∑n
i=1 ēi. We will make extensive use of this function in the subsequent
analysis.
For any particular government method of injecting permits, we can define S(P, τ)
as the government’s cumulative supply of permits until time τ on a price path rising
at the rate of interest and ending at P. Under delayed compliance, any price path
such that D(P, T ) = S(P, T ) equilibrates the market.
To determine when the equilibrium price path under delayed compliances gen-
erates a disequilibrium under continual compliance, we will have to compute the
cumulative supply and demand for permits at any time τ under continual compliance
when the price rises throughout at the rate of interest, reaching P at T. A given
method of injecting permits will generate the same cumulative supply S(P, τ) under
the two regimes. Moreover, under continual compliance firm i’s demand for permits
at τ is also given by equations (3.1) and (3.2). Provided the price path rises at the
rate of interest, each firm’s cumulative demand from the outset to time T will be the
same under the two regimes.10
However, equilibrium under continual compliance requires that D(P, τ) ≤ S(P, τ)
for all τ ∈ [0, T ) in addition to D(P, T ) = S(P, T ). That is, in the continual com-
pliance regime, agents must be provided enough permits to be able to cover their
emissions at every instant and not merely the last one. Since the requirement of
equilibrium is more restrictive under continual compliance, price paths that equili-
brate the market under delayed compliance but where D(P, τ) > S(P, τ) for some
τ ∈ [0, T ), fail to equilibrate it under continual compliance.
10The cumulative demands no longer coincide on price paths that rise somewhere more slowly than
the rate of interest. Suppose, for example, that the price is constant at P until T . Then at every
instant under continual compliance emissions would solve −c′i(ei(t)) = P, for t ∈ [0, T ] and i =
1, . . . n which is strictly smaller than the solution to (3.1); hence, cumulative demand until T would
be strictly smaller on such a price path under continual compliance. However, this observation is
unimportant since the equilibrium price path under delayed compliance must always rise at the rate
of interest and we will be checking whether such a price path equilibrates the permit market under
continual compliance.
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3.3 Auctions with Reserve Prices
Throughout we will assume that g permits are “grandfathered” at the outset and
that the number grandfathered is smaller than the cumulative emissions that would
have occurred without a cap-and-trade program (g < T
∑n
i=1 ēi).
In this section, we assume that the government commits at the outset to conduct
a sequence of auctions. The date, amount, and reserve price of each auction is an-
nounced at the outset. Let ti denote the date of the i
th auction, ai its amount, and
pi its reserve price (assumed strictly positive) for i = 1, . . . A, where A is the total
number of auctions to be held during the compliance period, [0, T ].
To determine the equilibrium price path under delayed compliance, we construct
the cumulative demand and cumulative supply curves and determine their unique
point of intersection. The cumulative demand curve is simply D(P, T ), which is
downward-sloping with respect to P. The cumulative supply curve S(P, T ) is a step-
function. For the price path with the terminal price of zero, aggregate supply consists
of the g grandfathered permits. As the terminal price is increased, it eventually equals
lowest capitalized reserve price. At that terminal price, the cumulative supply is
indeterminate—as small as g and as large as g plus the amount offered at the auction
with the lowest capitalized reserve price. If the terminal price is slightly higher, the
cumulative supply equals the upper end of this interval. Cumulative supply would
remain at that level until the terminal price reached the next-to-the-lowest capitalized
reserve price. A sufficiently high terminal price will equal the highest of the capitalized
reserve prices of the A auctions. Any higher terminal price will elicit the maximal
supply of g +
∑A
i=1 ai permits.
There exists a unique equilibrium price path and terminal price, P. Existence
follows since a zero terminal price would generate excess cumulative demand (by
assumption, T
∑n
i=1 ēi > g) while a sufficiently high terminal price would generate
excess cumulative supply (cumulative supply g +
∑A
i=1 ai is bounded away from zero
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and cumulative demand approaches zero for sufficiently high P). Moreover the inter-
section point must be unique since, at any higher price, demand is strictly smaller and
supply weakly larger while, at any lower price, demand is strictly larger and supply
weakly smaller.
To construct the supply curve geometrically, proceed as follows: (1) on a diagram
with time on the horizontal axis and price per permit on the vertical axis (see Figure
3.1), record the date and reserve-price pair (ti, pi) of each of the A auctions; (2)
determine the capitalized value (Pi) of each reserve price by drawing through each
of these A points a price path rising at the rate of interest and noting its height at
T (Pi = pie
r(T−ti)). For terminal prices smaller than the smallest capitalized reserve
price, only the g grandfathered permits are supplied to the market. For higher prices,
the cumulative supply function S(P, T ) will have a horizontal step of length ai at
height Pi for i = 1, . . . A.
Our methodology can be used to predict the consequences of any exogenous path
of auction reserve prices. For example, suppose the auction reserve price rises exactly
at the rate of interest. Then, if bids at one auction strictly exceed its reserve price,
bids at the other auctions will strictly exceed their reserve prices. Conversely, if no
bids meet the reserve price in one auction, none will meet it in any other auction.
If instead the exogenous auction reserve price rises faster than the rate of interest,
then if bids fail to meet the reserve price in one auction, no bids will be acceptable
in subsequent auctions while if bids do meet the reserve price in one auction, bids
in prior auctions will also be acceptable. Consequently, when the exogenous reserve
price rises faster than the rate of interest, auctions where bids fail to meet the reserve
price cluster at the end of the compliance period.
If instead the exogenous auction reserve prices rise slower than the rate of interest,
then if bids fail to meet the reserve price in one auction, no bids will be acceptable
in earlier auctions while if bids do meet the reserve price in one auction, bids in sub-
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sequent auctions will also be acceptable. Consequently, when the exogenous reserve
price rises slower than the rate of interest, auctions where bids fail to meet the reserve
price cluster at the beginning of the compliance period.
Although our methodology can be applied to any exogenous path of reserve prices,
we illustrate it below in the simplest manner. Hence, we assume that all the reserve
prices are the same. In Figure 3.1, all auctions have the same reserve price (pi = pj).
Since these reserve prices rise by less than the rate of interest, P1 > P2 > P3 > P4.
In the example portrayed, the equilibrium terminal price P∗ is contained in the open
interval (P4,P3). Hence, no bids are accepted at the first three auctions but all of
a4 permits are sold at the fourth auction at the price P
∗er(t4−T ) > p. Therefore, in
equilibrium emissions equal g + a4.
[Figure 3.1]
If the government had auctioned no permits at t4 but had instead added these a4
permits to the number grandfathered, then the cumulative supply curve would become
g + a4 for terminal prices below P4 but the modified cumulative supply curve would
still intersect the unchanged cumulative demand curve at the same point. Hence, the
equilibrium price path would not change under delayed compliance nor would the
cumulative emissions it induces. Alternatively, if the government had grandfathered
no permits but had instead auctioned these g permits along with the a4 permits at
t4, then the cumulative supply at prices below P4 would be zero and the cumulative
supply at P4 would be as large as g+a4. Nonetheless this modified cumulative supply
curve would still intersect the cumulative demand curve at the same point. Neither
change would affect the equilibrium under delayed compliance.
If the entire sum of permits (g + a4) was grandfathered at the outset, then this
same price path would also equilibrate the market under continual compliance. But
if all of these permits were made available instead at t4, then a disequilibrium would
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inevitably occur since, for some τ < T,D(P, τ) > S(P, τ). In Figure 3.2, we plot
cumulative supply and demand until τ along the equilibrium price path under delayed
compliance (the price path ending at P∗). Since the path generates an equilibrium
under delayed compliance, the two curves intersect at T and D(P∗, T ) = g + a4.
An equilibrium under continual compliance requires in addition that the cumulative
supply curve lies nowhere strictly below the cumulative demand curve for τ ∈ [0, T ).
Let g̃ be the number of permits the government chooses to grandfather initially. We
have drawn the boundary case where g̃ = D(P∗, t4) permits are grandfathered and
(g + a4) − g̃ are auctioned at t4. If the government grandfathered strictly less than
D(P∗, t4) permits and added them instead to the amount auctioned at t4, then the
equilibrium under delayed compliance could no longer be supported as an equilibrium
under continual compliance. Instead, the price path would consist of segments rising
at the rate of interest, separated by a downward jump at t4.
11
[Figure 3.2]
3.3.1 Non-existence of Equilibrium Induced by the Rules of California’s
AB-32
Returning to the case of delayed compliance, suppose that cumulative demand
was so large that P∗ ∈ (P2,P1). That is, every auction after t1 sells out, but bids
in this first auction are below its reserve price (p1). Under the rules of California’s
AB-32, the a1 permits which failed to sell in the first auction would be returned to the
“Auction Holding Account.”12 Some of these permits would be available for sale in
11We note that, although we have assumed throughout that g permits are grandfathered at the
outset, distributing some of these g permits later would not affect the equilibrium price path under
delayed compliance. No matter when the g permits are distributed the cumulative supply curve
S(P, T ) will remain unchanged. On the other hand, under continual compliance, distributing some
of the g permits at a subsequent date may induce a higher price initially and a drop of the permit
price when the subsequent permit injection occurs (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012).
12Final Regulation Order, §95911. Format for Auction of California GHG Allowances. (b) (4) (A)
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the fourth auction since it would have occurred “after two consecutive auctions have
resulted in an auction settlement price greater than the applicable Auction Reserve
Price.”13 However, not all of the a1 permits could be made available. At most the
number of permits which can be added to the auction at t4 is 25% of a4.
14 It is
not clear to us how many of these permits would be offered and who decides, but at
the old equilibrium price excess supply would occur because these unsold additional
permits would be offered in an auction where the market price exceeds the reserve
price. As a result, the equilibrium price path under delayed compliance would rise to
a lower terminal price.
Offering unsold permits for sale if and only if permits are sold at two preceding
auctions in a row can create a situation where no competitive equilibrium exists.
Suppose, for example, that every bid is strictly below the reserve price in the first
auction but the next two auctions sell out. Suppose cumulative demand is sufficiently
high that in the absence of the rule regarding unsold permits that P∗ ∈ (P2,P1).
Under this rule min(a1, 0.25a4) of the permits from the first auction can be offered in
the fourth auction. If min(a1, 0.25a4) ≥ D(P2)− g − a2 − a3 − a4 = D(P2)−D(P∗)
then there will be excess supply at any terminal price strictly exceeding P2.
15 But at
any terminal price equal to or strictly below P2, there will be excess demand since,
in the absence of two consecutive auctions where permits are sold at prices strictly
higher than the reserve price, none of the unsold permits from auction 1 can be offered
for sale in the fourth auction, and then D(P) > g+a2 +a3 +a4 holds for all P ≤ P2.
We illustrate a situation with no equilibrium in Figure 3.3.16
13Quoted from Final Regulation Order, §95911. Format for Auction of California GHG Al-
lowances. (b) (4) (B)
14Final Regulation Order, §95911. Format for Auction of California GHG Allowances. (b) (4) (C)
15We use the excess supply condition at any terminal price higher than P2: D(P2) ≤ g +
min(a1, 0.25a4) + a2 + a3 + a4 and the definition of P
∗: D(P∗) = g + a2 + a3 + a4.
16Our analysis clarifies that existing regulations should be changed. Indeed, it suggests a remedy:
re-word the regulation so permits may be sold as long as the settlement price in each of the two
preceding auctions equals or exceeds the auction’s reserve price.
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[Figure 3.3]
3.4 Sales at Specified Prices
Permits can also be injected during the compliance period by sales at a specified
price, which we denote p̄. To simplify, we assume in this section that all permits
not grandfathered at the outset are injected by such sales. Such sales can occur
over a specified time interval which commences at tc and finishes at tf or until all
of the R permits in the “Cost Containment Reserve” have been sold. The Kerry-
Lieberman bill envisioned such sales over a finite interval. They resemble a continuum
of auctions with reserve price p over the time interval [tc, tf ] but with R available in
the initial auction, and everything unsold in one auction immediately available for
sale in subsequent auctions.
Since the sales price over the interval is constant, the price at tf has the smallest
capitalized value (Pf = p̄e
r(T−tf )). In Figure 3.4, we depict the interval of offers and
the sales price. As in Figure 3.1, we depict Pf by noting the terminal price on the
path through the point (tf , p̄) rising at the rate of interest. To derive the cumulative
supply curve, note that if the terminal price is strictly smaller than Pf , then nothing
would sell during this time interval and the cumulative supply would just be g. If the
terminal price is strictly larger, then the cumulative supply would be g + R. If the
terminal price is exactly Pf then the cumulative supply is any number of permits in
the closed interval [g, g +R].
[Figure 3.4]
Suppose cumulative demand is sufficiently large that under delayed compliance
the terminal price strictly exceeds Pf . Then R permits sell instantaneously, either
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at some interior date τ ∗ ∈ (tc, tf ) or at the first moment of the sale (tc), where τ ∗ is
determined so that P∗e−r(T−τ
∗) = p̄ for Pf < P
∗ < Pc. In either case, such purchases
at an infinite rate are just like “first-generation” speculative attacks which have been
widely discussed in the literatures on foreign exchange markets and on commodity
agreements.17
In commodity markets or foreign exchange markets, defending the ceiling price
typically requires the government to sell at a slow rate over a finite interval prior
to the attack. Then, at some endogenously determined date, further defense of the
ceiling requires the instantaneous sale of the remaining stock to buyers who store it
for later re-sale to private agents at higher prices. If government stocks are sufficiently
small, however, the attack occurs as soon as the ceiling price is reached.
In the market for emissions trading under delayed compliance, defense of the
ceiling never involves selling permits at a slow rate over a finite interval prior to the
attack. For no one would buy those permits. No one needs to surrender permits until
the compliance date and, if the government did sell permits over an interval at the
same ceiling price, it would always be cheaper to postpone their purchase until the
end of the interval. With emissions permits under delayed compliance, therefore, the
speculative attack occurs the moment the ceiling price is reached. The permits are
then held by private agents until the compliance date, when they are returned to the
government to cover emissions since the end of the previous compliance period.
Suppose in the equilibrium under delayed compliance that the terminal price is P∗
and cumulative emissions are g+R. Hence, D(P∗, T ) = g+R. Suppose the speculative
attack occurs at the interior point τ ∗ > tc. Reallocating the g + R permits between
the initial allocation and the Cost Containment Reserve will not alter the equilibrium
price path or the date of the attack under delayed compliance. Such reallocation may
17For a discussion of speculative attacks on commodity ceilings defended by bufferstock sales, see
Salant and Henderson (1978) and Salant (1983). For discussions of how their idea was developed
further in the international finance literature, see Krugman (1999) and Flood et al. (2012).
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however affect the price path under continual compliance. In Figure 3.5, we depict
the boundary case where the government chooses to grandfather g̃ = D(P∗, τ ∗) and
to stock the cost containment reserve with the remaining permits. Hence, g+R− g̃ =
D(P∗, T )−D(P∗, τ ∗). If g̃ were reduced so that more permits were moved from the
initial allocation to the Cost Containment Reserve, the equilibrium under continual
compliance will differ from the equilibrium under delayed compliance. In that case,
the equilibrium price path under continual compliance will have a segment rising at
the rate of interest until tc and then (weakly) dropping to p̄ for an endogenous interval
of time before rising continuously from p̄ again at the rate of interest. A speculative
attack must occur here too but it occurs later than under delayed compliance. We
also note that when a speculative attack occurs (P∗ > Pf ), marginally changing the
level of the price ceiling p̄ does not affect the equilibrium price path and only alters
the date of the attack under delayed compliance.
[Figure 3.5]
3.5 Conclusion
Cap-and-trade programs rather than emissions taxes are being utilized as the main
vehicle to combat global warming by national (and state) governments of advanced
countries. In the United States, some permits are withheld from the initial allocation
and injected subsequently into the market by auctions or sales at fixed prices in an
attempt to limit price increases (through so-called “price collars” or “safety valves”).
The effect of these subsequent injections depends on whether the program requires
regulated firms to be in compliance continually or merely periodically. Until now,
virtually all analyses have assumed continual compliance even though actual programs
always require delayed compliance.
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The purpose of our paper has been to develop a methodology for analyzing the ef-
fects of such injections in a regime of delayed compliance. In the process of illustrating
the use of this methodology, we identified two consequences of the provisions of cap-
and-trade programs (potential speculative attacks and nonexistence of equilibrium)
that have escaped notice.
We have also clarified when the equilibrium under continual compliance differs
from the equilibrium under delayed compliance. We have not described in detail the
effects of such injections under continual compliance since no actual programs require
that.18
We have assumed away all forms of uncertainty in the current analysis but will
address this issue in the future. Permit markets may be subject to three kinds of
uncertainty: (1) uncertainty about the aggregate demand for permits that will be
resolved by an information disclosure at a fixed date in the future; (2) aggregate
demand shocks in each period; and (3) regulatory uncertainty.
The consequences of disclosing information at a known time about the demand
for permits is illustrated by the collapse of the permit price in Europe following the
disclosure of low demand for permits. In the case of demand shocks each period,
the price path would become stochastic rather than deterministic. But if agents are
risk neutral, little would change. If one works backward from the compliance period,
assuming that on that date (1) all permits will be surrendered to the government and
(2) agents with uncovered cumulative emissions must pay a well-specified penalty
then, to equilibrate the market in the penultimate period under delayed compliance,
the penultimate price must equal the discounted price expected in the next period.
For, if that expected price were strictly higher, there would be excess demand for
permits in the current period; and, if that expected price were strictly lower, there
would be excess supply in the current period. But the same argument can be repeated
18Interested readers are referred to our companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012) where such
a detailed analysis is presented.
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as one works backward. In the stochastic equilibrium under delayed compliance,
therefore, the price in every period must equal the discounted price then expected to
prevail in any future period.
Regulatory uncertainty arises in part from the government’s understandable goal
of having the flexibility to cope with future circumstances. Regulators tend to avoid
committing to future actions or policy rules. They prefer “discretion” to “precommit-
ment.” However, government flexibility, while understandable, distorts the intertem-
poral decision-making of private agents. This is true whether the private agents fully
understand the regulator’s objectives (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) or regard govern-
ment actions as somewhat random (Salant and Henderson, 1978). McWilliams et al.
(2011) have shown the importance of regulatory uncertainty in one permit market.
Participants in the SO2 market anticipated that at some unknown time in the future
more permits would be required to cover each unit of SO2 emissions and the price
of permits would jump up. Anticipation of this uncertain event resulted in higher
permit prices and more abatement; moreover, agents were willing to hold permits
even though the permit price was rising by less than the rate of interest because of
the capital gain they would receive when the uncertainty was resolved.
An important topic left for future work is welfare analysis. Under our assumptions,
the cumulative emissions that arise in the equilibrium will be generated at least
discounted costs since the marginal cost of abatement has the same present value in
every period. However, under the plausible assumption that the stock of greenhouse
gasses generates a flow of damages at each point in time, it has been shown (Kling
and Rubin, 1997; Leiby and Rubin, 2001) that such an emissions path does not
minimize the more relevant welfare functional—the discounted sum of damages plus
abatement costs. In determining the socially optimal emissions path given such a
damage function and in quantifying the welfare loss that would occur under a delayed
compliance regime, we will have to take explicit account of when firms install their
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abatement technologies.19
Once we have calculated the welfare consequences of periods of delayed compliance
of any given length, we can formally assess the optimal length of each compliance
period. But some observations need not await formal analysis. Intuitively, the longer
is each compliance period, the less likely is the government to wait for a period to
end before intervening. In addition, the longer the compliance period, the greater
the chance that (1) firms with uncovered pollution will go out of business before
having to comply and (2) large utilities which have not complied before the end of




Figure 3.1: The Cumulative Demand and Supply, and the Equilibrium Price Path in
the Case of Reserve Price Auctions
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Figure 3.2: The Boundary Case in the Reserve Price Auctions
87
Figure 3.3: The Case of No Competitive Equilibrium under the Rules of California’s
AB-32
88
Figure 3.4: The Cumulative Demand and Supply, and the Equilibrium Price Path in
the Case of Sales at Fixed Prices
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The Impact of Repatriation Tax rates on Dividend
Payments by Foreign Subsidiaries
In this appendix, we theoretically examine how the Hartman result changes when
firms expect a decrease in repatriation tax rates on dividends using a simple three-
period model based on Grubert (1998) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003). The model
consists of three periods, 0, 1, and 2. Periods 0 and 1 are the periods before the
introduction of the dividend exemption system, and period 2 is the period under the
new exemption system. Denote the repatriation tax rates on dividends in period
t by τDt for t = 0, 1, 2. Dividend exemption decreases the repatriation tax rates on




2 . Consider a parent firm in Japan and
its “mature” foreign affiliate located in country c that has enough retained earnings
(R) to finance its investment. The foreign affiliate produces output using capital with
the production function f(K), where K is capital input. The production function is
strictly concave, strictly increasing, continuous, and continuously differentiable, and
satisfies the Inada condition: limK↓0 f
′(K) = ∞. For simplicity, we assume that
capital does not depreciate over time.
At the end of period 0, the affiliate determines the amount of retained earnings
out of the stock of retained earnings R for reinvestment in period 1, denoted by
92
E. The rest of earnings (R − E) is repatriated to the parent by dividends. At the
beginning of period 1, investment takes place using capital input E and the profit
from the investment comes at the end of period 1. At the end of period 1, the
affiliate repatriates D1 of the after-tax affiliate income, retaining R to reinvest in
period 2. Denote the statutory tax rate of country c by τc. Then D1 can be written
as D1 = ((1− τc)f(E)−R). In period 2, the affiliate produces using (E + R) of
capital and repatriates the entire net wealth to the parent firm in Japan at the end
of the period by dividends. Thus D2 = (1− τc)f(E + R) + E + R. The parent firm




























where r is the real interest rate.
































(1− τc)f ′(E +R) + 1− τD2
]
= 0.
These two conditions can be rewritten as
(1− τc)f ′(E) = r, (A.1)











Equation (A.1) implies that the initial investment E does not depend on the




2 ), R also does not depend on the repatriation tax rate because equation
(A.2) then yields (1 − τc)f ′(E + R) = r. Therefore, as Hartman (1985) shows, if
τD1 = τ
D
2 , the repatriation tax rate affects neither foreign investment nor dividend
payments by the subsidiary.
However, if τD1 6= τD2 , Hartman’s result fails to hold. The total differentiation of





= − 1 + r








(E +R) + 1
(1− τD2 ) (1− τc)f
′′(E +R)
< 0. (A.4)
Equation (A.3) says that when the repatriation tax rate in period 1 is higher given
the repatriation tax rate in the next period, the affiliate increases dividend payments
in period 2. Equation (A.4) says that when the repatriation tax rate decreases in
period 2, the affiliate will retain more profits in period 1 by decreasing dividend
payments in that period and will increase them in period 2.
These results imply that Japan’s foreign dividend exemption will stimulate divi-
dend repatriations in two ways. Dividend exemption decreases the repatriation tax
rate, and as a result, Japanese multinationals face the same lowered repatriation tax
rate after the introduction of the dividend exemption system (τD1 > τ
D
2 ). Thus, as
equation (A.4) shows, the lower repatriation tax rate (τD2 ) will stimulate the dividend
repatriations of Japanese multinationals given τD1 . Japanese multinational firms had
faced different repatriation tax rates under the worldwide tax system (τD1 ) depending
on their foreign tax credit positions and the corporate tax policies of host countries
(e.g., corporate tax rates and bases). Therefore, as equation (A.3) implies, foreign
affiliates that had faced higher repatriation tax rates will pay out more dividends
under the new exemption system.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of |Π| > 0
To sign |Π|, I assume local stability of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Denote
country i’s revenue function as Ri(ti, zi, tj, zj). Following Dixit (1986), I consider the
myopic adjustment process under which each country increases its statutory tax rate
and the effective marginal tax rate if it perceives positive marginal tax revenue from



















zi are the time derivatives of ti and zi, respectively. Subscripts ti
and zi on R
i(ti, zi, tj, zj) denote partial derivatives. s
i
t > 0 and s
i
z > 0 are the
adjustment speeds of ti and zi, respectively. Taking linear approximation of the
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symmetric equilibrium ti = tj = t










































































The symmetric equilibrium is locally stable if and only if all eigenvalues of the
matrix on the right hand side of the above equation have negative real parts, which

























z |Π| > 0.
Since sit > 0, s
i
z > 0, s
j
t > 0, and s
j
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